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ARTICLES
Gifts, Bargains, and Form
JANE B. BARON*
It is a truism of Anglo-American law that there is a difference between
gifts and bargains, between donative transfers and contractual exchanges.'
The two types of transactions are commonly presumed to accomplish
divergent purposes in distinct settings. Donative transfers carry out benev-
olent urges in the context, usually, of the family, whereas contractual
exchanges carry out self-interested aims in the context, usually, of the
market.2 In addition, gifts and bargains are subject to divergent legal
requirements, taught and learned in separate law school courses. Gifts
* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law. I am grateful to Temple
University School of Law for providing financial support for the preparation of this article,
and to Chris Kuczynski for providing excellent research assistance; he taught me that quality
work and eyesight have nothing to do with one another.
I thank Gregory S. Alexander, Richard Baron, Rob Bartow, Jesse Dukeminier, Mary Louise
Fellows, Rick Greenstein, Barbara Kopytoff, John H. Langbein and Mark Tushnet for their
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. My appreciation of their efforts should not be read to
imply that they agree with my thesis. All errors are mine alone.
1. A note on terminology: Technically speaking, gifts (inter vivos and causa mortis) are
but a subset of a larger category, "donative transfers," which also includes wills and other
devices such as trusts. For the sake of simplicity, however, the term "gifts" is often used in
this article as a less cumbersome synonym for donative transfers.
Similarly, bargained-for exchanges are but a subset of a larger category, "contracts," which
also includes agreements enforceable on the basis of reliance or unjust enrichment by one of
the parties. The term "contracts" is used in this article primarily to refer to bargained-for
eichanges.
2. See, e.g., Mason, The Utility of Consideration-A Comparative View, 41 CoLuM. L.
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require formalities such as delivery, signature, or attestation, whereas con-
tracts require offer, acceptance and consideration.'
The divergence between the requirements is, under accepted principles,
not arbitrary; rather, it is thought to be a rational response to the respective
goals and settings of the two different fields of law. Thus, with respect to
gifts, where the primary legal goal is to effectuate donative intent, formalities
are said to be required to put that intent beyond question. In contrast, with
regard to contracts, where the primary legal goal is protection of expectations
and security of transactions, consideration is said to be required to mark
off those promises customarily understood, in a market economy, to be
binding.
The divergent doctrinal treatment of gifts and bargains is thought to be
appropriate not only in light of the different purposes of the two transac-
tions, but also in light of their relative importance. Traditional discussions
of gifts and contracts posit a world in which legal resources are scarce and
costly; legal intervention must, in consequence, be rationed. In these dis-
cussions, gifts are treated as one-sided transfers which merely redistribute
existing wealth, and they thus are not thought to warrant legal enforcement
unless their formality renders administration of them simple. Bargains, on
the other hand, are considered two-sided exchanges which create wealth,
and due to their substantive importance they are thought to warrant en-
forcement without formality.
The divergence between the doctrinal requirements for gifts and bargains,
and the particular requirements applicable to each, are thus alike considered
appropriate responses to the true nature of each distinct kind of transfer.
The notion that there is a "fit" between the nature of a given transaction
REv. 825, 827 (1941) ("[I]f a promise sued on is alleged to have its cause in a liberal intention,
we are prompted to inquire into the family and personal relations of the parties in order to
test the probability that such a promise was actually made as alleged, questions which would
not be pertinent if the promise was alleged to have a commercial basis."); Eisenberg, Donative
Promises, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 5 (1979) ("[Alctors involved in a donative transaction are
often emotionally involved.").
There are, to be sure, cases at the margin: promises of gifts to nonfamily members and
contracts between family members. In these cases, a court must determine whether the
transaction in question is "truly" a one-sided donation or a two-sided exchange. See, e.g.,
Balfour v. Balfour, 2 L.R.-K.B. 571 (C.A. 1919); Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845); Wood
v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917); Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa.
465 (1857). This determination is possible only if gifts and bargains are assumed to be
fundamentally different, distinguishable types of transactions. See infra Part II.
3. The extent to which the latter requirements are appropriately characterized as formalities
is open to question. The "objective theory" of contracts, the rule that an acceptance must
match the terms of the offer, and the requirement of "definiteness" all may operate as
formalities. See Friedman, Law, Rules and the Interpretation of Written Documents, 59 Nw.
U.L. REv. 751, 775-76 (1964-1965); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HhAv. L. REv. 1685, 1691-92 (1976). On the other hand, the consideration requirement is
said to have a substantive, as well as formal, dimension. See infra Part II.
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and the legal rules applicable to it is comforting. It suggests the law is
rational, responsive to reality.
There are, however, reasons to question this notion of "fit." First, it
rests on assumptions about human behavior in giving and bargaining which
are at odds with conventional views of the contexts in which such transfers
are ordinarily said to arise. Despite the benevolent motives and family
settings usually associated with gifts, the accepted justification of donative
formality assumes that, in giving, people are fundamentally unreliable and
deceitful. Despite the self-interested alms and arm's length relationships
usually associated with bargains, the accepted justification of the consider-
ation doctrine assumes that, in business, people are trusting and trustworthy.
These justifications turn the world topsy-turvy. We are to be suspected
when we give, relied on when we trade.
Second, the notion of "fit"-the entire structure of rule and justification
in the field of gifts-requires that gifts and bargains be truly different
transactions. Only if gifts are not exchanges can they be characterized as
so unimportant that they warrant enforcement on the basis of form alone.
The now-accepted legal definition of a gift as a transfer without consider-
ation is designed to assure that any particular transaction can be placed on
one and only one side of the gift/bargain line. Yet there is nothing inevitable
about this definition, which developed late in the life of the common law
and which has never been used in the civil law. Indeed, the definition
contrasts sharply with non-lawyers' understandings of gifts. Anthropologi-
cal, sociological and psychological studies of gifts all suggest that gifts and
bargains are alike exchanges, differing only in that bargains involve the
exchange of commodities, while gifts may involve the exchange of noncom-
modities such as status, obligation, "psychic reward" or the like. The
"purely" one-sided donative transfer is not part of the "reality" non-legal
social scientists have studied.
In light of this historical, comparative and social scientific evidence, the
presumed dichotomy between gifts and bargains is difficult to sustain. This
essay argues that that dichotomy is less a reflection of real differences than
it is a construct, a portrait or story, depicting individuals whose urges to
give are sharply differentiated from their urges to trade and a world in
which self-interested gain is more important and more frequent than oth6r-
oriented beneficence. Like any caricature, this picture emphasizes some
aspects of experience, but suppresses others. In so doing, it molds our
vision of our attributes and capabilities, and it may limit our view of our
potential.
Part I explores the justifications which have traditionally been offered to
explain the formalities of gift-giving, justifications which rely on the ritual,
evidentiary, protective and channelling functions of form. An inquiry into
the historical origins of the delivery and Wills Act formalities suggests that
19891
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these functions may not have been of primary concern when the formal
requirements were adopted. Moreover, the functional justification relies on
rather pessimistic assumptions about human behavior in the gift-giving
context. Evidence from the social sciences provides a basis from which to
question those assumptions.
Part II turns to the doctrine of consideration. That doctrine is essential
to the gift/bargain dichotomy because it is the presence or absence of
consideration that is used to set a disputed transaction on one side or the
other of the presumed bright line. Consideration is said to delineate which
promises are worthy of legal enforcement. It gives effect to executory
business bargains because of their wealth enhancing qualities and denies
effect to gift promises because of their lack of social utility. The justifica-
tions offered for the consideration doctrine reflect the view that gifts and
bargains truly differ in both nature and importance.
Part III returns to gifts, questioning whether it is accurate to define them
as nonbargains. Historical and comparative evidence suggests other defini-
tions are possible. More importantly, social scientific studies suggest it may
be misguided to distinguish sharply between gifts and bargains, that the two
apparently different categories of transfer share many attributes. If gifts
are not the one-sided transactions the law depicts, then there may be reason
to doubt the need for the formal rules currently applicable to them.
Moreover, if gifts and contracts are alike exchanges, then the disparaging
discussions of gifts in the contracts context may be read to reflect a view
that market exchanges are more significant than other exchanges. This view
ignores the possibility that not all wealth consists of commodities. In the
end, the use of intent-defeating formalities in an area of law ostensibly
committed to the effectuation of intent may express an underlying ambiv-
alence about the true "worth" of gifts in a society organized around
commodities markets.
I. FORMALITY AND FUNCTION IN DONATIVE TRANSFERS
The law of gratuitous transfers is said to have as its object the effectuation
of donative intent.4 In the abstract, there is nothing incongruous about the
4. See, e.g., Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 2
(1941) ("One fundamental proposition is that, under a legal system recognizing the individu-
alistic institution of private property and granting to the owner the power to determine his
successors in ownership, the general philosophy of the courts should favor giving effect to an
intentional exercise of that power.") (citation omitted); Langbein, Substantial Compliance
With the Wills Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 489, 491 (1975) ("The first principle of the law of
wills .is freedom of testation."); Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels
and of Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 U. ILL. L. REv. 341, 350
(1926) ("It is not to be doubted that the tendency of the law has been ... towards the policy
of allowing intention to govern, or that such a tendency is a wise one.").
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use of formal requirements to serve this goal. The formalities required by
the law of gratuitous transfers can be conceived as but means to individually
chosen ends, of concern only if a donor has decided to make a gratuitous
transfer, and pertaining only to how the transfer is to be made. 5
Yet it is widely recognized that in reality, formalities often defeat donative
intent. The undelivered gift remains the donor's property however passion-
ately she or he may have wished to give it away; the unwitnessed formal
will is of no effect.6 The irony of these results has not gone unremarked.
Why should a body of law ostensibly devoted to the effectuation of donative
intent adopt a series of requirements that may-and frequently do-thwart
that intent?7
The commonly accepted answer to this question is that formalities may
be justified, despite their intent-defeating potential, on functional grounds.
They provide a ritual that alerts the donor to the import of the act she or
he is undertaking, they provide reliable evidence of the intent to give and
the terms of the gift, they protect donors against fraud, undue influence or
the like, and, finally, they channel donors into using easily recognized
devices for gratuitous transfers, thus easing administrative burdens and
5. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1691 ("Formalities are premised on the lawmaker's indif-
ference as to which of a number of alternative relationships the parties decide to enter. Their
purpose is to make sure, first, that the parties know what they are doing, and, second, that
the judge will know what they did.").
6. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 4, at 1; Langbein, supra note 4, at 489; Mechem, supra
note 4, at 350.
7. See, e.g., Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 4, at 3; Langbein, supra note 4, at 491-92.
There has been a noticeable trend in recent years to relax the formal requirements for probate
transfers. See, e.g., UNIFoRM PROBATE CODE (UPC) § 2-502 (eliminating the requirement that
a will be signed "at the end") and § 2-505(b) (eliminating the requirement that witnesses to
wills be "disinterested"). Further steps in the same direction seem to be in the offing. See
Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia's
Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 CoLum. L. Rnv. 1 (1987). The rise in frequency and
acceptance of nonprobate transfers has also made it easier for would-be donors to avoid the
rigors of formal requirements. See Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of
the Law of Succession, 97 HARv. L. Rev. 1108 (1984) [hereinafter Langbein, The Nonprobate
Revolution].
The actual frequency with which wills or gifts are defeated on formal grounds is difficult
to determine. One recent study of will contests concludes that "invalidation of wills in will
contests on the ground of nonobservance of testamentary formalities is rare and of minimal
significance." Schoenblum, Will Contests-An Empirical Study, 22 RmAu PROP. & TA. J. 607,
647 (1987). Yet as that study found, only a handful of wills are contested. Id. at 614. The
infrequency of contests cannot confidently be attributed to lack of formal grounds for contests;
potential litigants may simply be disinclined to sue, or they may perceive the will's provisions
to be fair, or they may be unaware of the legal remedies available. Id. at 614-15. Thus, it
cannot confidently be said that compliance with donative formalities is easy or common.
In an area ostensibly devoted to the effectuation of donative intent, the invalidation of even
a handful of donative transfers on formal grounds is problematic. The potential of formalities
to defeat intent must be taken seriously, regardless how frequently that potential is realized.
The ultimate question is why any donative transfer should be invalidated on purely formal
grounds.
19891
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ensuring that intended transfers will be given legal effect.8 The functional
justification of form has a dual aspect. To the extent that formalities protect
donors from impulsiveness, misinterpretation and pressure, their focus is
individual, "private" will. On the other hand, to the extent that formalities
foster careful deliberation and efficient administration of gifts, their focus
is social, "public" good.
The notion that form serves function is not unique to the law of donative
transfers; it has been discussed in connection with such other fields as
contracts and negotiable instruments.9 However, in the donative transfers
field it has become so widely accepted that the choice of formal rules no
longer seems to be a choice at all. Debate among commentators and, to a
lesser extent, courts tends to focus not on whether formalities are appro-
priate, but instead on whether strict compliance with formalities should be
required or whether, in disputed transfers, the functions of form have been
satisfied by other means.' 0
While the debate concerning the interrelation of form and function is of
undeniable importance, there lies beneath the debate a very different ques-
tion which is worthy of some examination. Why do we need the functions
formalities serve? Delivery and attestation requirements can be justified on
ceremonial and evidentiary grounds only if donors and those who must
effectuate donative transfers require rituals and proofs. If they do indeed
have these requirements, why?
The following sections examine this question. Part A explores the histor-
ical origins of the formalities of donative transfers. This history suggests
that the functions commonly attributed to the formal requirements may not
have been of major importance when those requirements were formulated.
Part B examines the functional justification of formalities offered in the
influential articles by Mechem and by Gulliver and Tilson early in the
twentieth century. This examination focuses on the unarticulated assump-
tions on which the functional justification relies. Part C canvasses the social
scientific literature on altruism and giving. This literature presents a vision
of giving that is at odds with that presupposed by the traditional functional
justification and suggests that the assumptions underlying the traditional
justification may be unfounded.
A. The History of the Formalities of Donative Transfers
The formalities of the law of donative transfers have a respectable
historical pedigree. The modern requirements for a valid will-a writing,
8. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 4, at 3-5; Langbein, supra note 4, at 492-97; Mechem,
supra note 4, at 348-50. See also Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 CoLum. L. REv. 799,
800-04 (1941) (discussing these functions in contract law).
9. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 3; Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the
Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FoanAm L. REv. 39 (1974).
10. See, e.g., Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955); Langbein, supra
note 4; See also infra note 72.
[Vol. 64:155
GIFTS, BARGAINS, AND FORM
signature, witnesses-were codified centuries ago, in the Statute of Wills
(1540)" and the Statute of Frauds (1677).12 The requirement that a gift be
delivered was discussed by Coke as early as 1675,13 and though the require-
ment was not firmly established until late in the nineteenth century, Kent
was already insisting upon it in 1806.14
The sheer age of these formal requirements lends credibility to the
functional justification. If they did not do something, how could we have
put up with them for so long? This sense of appropriateness is enhanced
by scattered references in early cases and treatises to some of the dangers
of evidentiary unreliability, perjury, and fraud that preoccupy the twentieth
century functional explanations.
The genesis of the now-familiar formal requirements is murky, compli-
cated, and often debated. However, as the review below suggests, what is
striking about the history of the requirements is how difficult it is to connect
the origins of the requirements to the functional justification that has been
offered for them. Formalities may in fact perform the functions ascribed
to them, but they do not seem to have been adopted because they do so.
1. Gifts
The need for delivery to complete an inter vivos gift" was discussed by
early treatise writers, but delivery was not conclusively established as a
requirement in England until Cochrane v. Moore16 was decided in 1890.17
Bracton stated that no gift was complete without tradition of the subject
of the gift.18 Yet in dictum that stirred great controversy later on, 19 Coke
11. The Act of Wills, Words, Primer Fifens, Whereby a Man May Defeif 2 Parts of His
Land (WVills Act, 1540), 32 Hen. 8, ch. 1.
12. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries (Statute of Frauds), 1677, 29 Car. 2,
ch. 3.
13. Wortes v. Clifton, 1 Rol. Rep. 61, 81 Eng. Rep. 328 (1675).
14. Noble v. Smith, 2 Johns. 52 (N.Y. 1806).
15. The second category of gifts, gifts causa mortis, also requires delivery. R. BROWN,
Tim LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 132 (W. Raushenbush 3d ed. 1975). This article does not
specifically discuss gifts causa mortis, which are subject to the additional requirements that
they be made in expectation of approaching death and that they be revocable if the donor
survives. Id. at 130-31.
16. 25 Q.B.D. 57 (1890).
17. Irons v. Smallpiece, 2 B. & Aid. 551, 106 Eng. Rep. 467 (1819), appeared to have
established that delivery is required in the case of gifts, yet the point remained in dispute
thereafter. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
18. 1 BRACTON 128, quoted in Stone, Delivery in Gifts of Personal Property, 20 COLU'M.
L. REv. 196, 196 (1920). Stone holds this statement to be the "genesis" of the delivery
requirement. Id.
19. See, e.g., Noble, 2 Johns. 52; Irons, 2 B. & Ad. 551, 106 Eng. Rep. 467. See also
Pollock, Gifts of Chattels Without Delivery, 6 LAw. Q. REv. 446, 448-49 (1890) (According
to Pollock, the common law rule requiring delivery was established during the reign of Edward
IV and had not been overruled by any modem decision. This rule was precisely the opposite
of the civil law rule and the opposite of that stated by Coke.).
1989]
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suggested that while delivery was required in the civil law, it was not a
requirement in the common law.20 Blackstone wrote that transfer of title by
gift could be made "either in writing, or by word of mouth, attested by
sufficient evidence, of which the delivery of possession is the strongest and
most essential." ' 2' Although early nineteenth century decisions in both
England22 and America23 held Coke's dictum to be inaccurate, the need for
delivery remained in dispute32 The conflict among the courts provoked the
elaborate discussion of the delivery requirement in Cochrane.
Some of those who insisted upon delivery prior to the decision in Cochrane
justified the requirement in functional terms. Blackstone's reference to
delivery of possession as "sufficient evidence" of a parol gift invokes the
evidentiary function.25 Others, noting the possibility that words of gift might
be "inadvertently uttered, ' 26 required delivery as an "act . . . evincing
deliberation and completeness of purpose, 2 7 and thus invoked the ritual
function. 28 Finally, courts referred to the "rapacity of unscrupulous
attendants" 29 and "opportunities of unfair dealing," 30 suggesting sensitivity
to the protective function. 3'
In light of this background, 32 it is somewhat surprising that neither of
the opinions in Cochrane relied on or even mentioned the functions of form
in holding delivery to be required to effectuate an inter vivos gift. Lord
Fry, with whom Lord Bowen concurred, justified the requirement entirely
20. Wortes, 1 Rol. Rep. 61, 81 Eng. Rep. 328.
21. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441.
22. Irons, 2 B. & Aid. 551, 106 Eng. Rep. 467.
23. Noble, 2 Johns. 52.
24. Winter v. Winter, 4 L.T.R. 639, 9 W.R. 747, 127 Rev. Rep. 925 (1861); Danby v.
Tucker, 31 W.R. 578 (1883). See also Arrington v. Arrington, 2 N.C. (I Hayw.) 1 (1789)
(where the identity of the property given can be otherwise proved, delivery is not required).
25. 2 W. BIACKSTONE, COMNMNTARMS *441. See also Pitts v. Magnum, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.)
588, 590 (1832) ("Possession is prima facie evidence of the right to personal property, and
nine times out of ten it is the only evidence.").
26. Adams v. Hayes, 24 N.C. (1 Ired.) 361, 368 (1842).
27. Id.
28. See also Chevallier v. Wilson, I Tex. 161, 172 (1846) (noting that "in moments of
playfulness or anger, or of excited feeling, parents may make loose declarations of having
given property to this or that one of their children").
29. Dickeschied v. Exchange Bank, 28 W. Va. 340, 368 (1886).
30. Id. at 369.
31. See Noble, 2 Johns. at 56 (delivery required to prevent mistake and imposition).
32. English courts were also sensitive to the need for formalities in the context of gifts
and wills. See, e.g., Sharington v. Strotton, 1 Plowd. 298, 308, 75 Eng. Rep. 454, 470 (1765)(Since words pass from man to man "lightly and inconsiderately," gifts require formalities to
ensure that donors will not be bound by words not intended to create legal obligation. Gifts
made by deed are binding without inquiry into consideration because "of the great deliberation
used in the making of deeds"); Whitchurch v. Whitchurch, 25 Eng. Rep. 118, 120 (1721)
(formalities act to "hinder . . .[a testator] from surprize"); Wyndham v. Chetwynd, 96 Eng.
Rep. 53, 55 (1757) (wherein Lord Mansfield discusses the Roman symbolic sale as a means of
testamentary disposition and the relationship of that ancient formality to the formalities
prescribed by the Statute of Frauds for the making of wills of land).
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in historical terms,3 holding, after extensive review of authorities, that the
"old law requiring delivery had never been overruled. ' 3 4 Lord Fry's histor-
ical analysis demonstrated that the delivery requirement had its origins not
in function but in medieval notions of seisin, which necessitated "tradition
or the delivery . . . from one man to another as essential to the transfer
of the property in [a] thing." 35
The opinion of Lord Esher is even more striking, for it comes close to
repudiating a functional justification for the delivery requirement. Lord
Esher noted that "there was a time when" actual delivery was required "as
part of the evidence" to prove the transfer of property "by way of exchange
or barter, or by way of bargain and sale for a consideration, or by way of
* . . a mere gift . . *"36 But, he concluded, "actual delivery in the case
of a 'gift' is more than evidence of the existence of the proposition of law
which constitutes a gift, . . it is part of the proposition itself . ...- 37
Lord Esher's opinion clearly verges on tautology, holding that delivery is
"part of" and not "evidence of" a gift without accounting why.38 Both
opinions, in the end, are declaratory, not explanatory. 39 Later commentators
and courts were quick to supply the omission, suggesting that, whatever the
historical origins of the delivery requirement, its perpetuation rested on the
33. Roscoe Pound derided the Cochrane court for its use of "the historical method."
Pound, Juristic Science and Law, 31 HAIv. L. REv. 1046, 1057 (1918).
34. The Cochrane court concluded:
This review of the authorities leads us to conclude that according to the old law
no gift or grant of a chattel was effectual to pass it whether by parol or by
deed, and whether with or without consideration unless accompanied by delivery:
that on that law two exceptions have been grafted, one in the case of deeds, and
the other in contracts of sale where the intention of the parties is that the
property shall pass before delivery .
Cochrane, 25 Q.B.D. at 72-73.
35. Id. at 65. See also Stone, supra note 18, at 197. For the proposition that delivery is
required for gifts of chattels as well as for gifts of land, both the Cochrane court and Stone
relied, in part, on Maitland, The Sesin of Chattels, I LAW. Q. REv. 324 (1885); Maitland,
The Mystery of Seisin, 2 LAw. Q. REv. 481 (1886); and Maitland, The Beatitude of Seisin,
(pts. 1 & 2), 4 LAw. Q. REv. 24, 286 (1888).
36. Cochrane, 25 Q.B.D. at 74.
37. Id. at 75.
38. Lord Escher's attempted explanation was as follows:
[There cannot be a "gift" without a giving and a taking. The giving and taking
are the two contemporaneous reciprocal acts which constitute a "gift." They are
a necessary part of the proposition that there has been a "gift." They are not
evidence to prove that there has been a gift, but facts to be proved to constitute
the proposition that there has been a gift ....
Cochrane, 25 Q.B.D. at 76. This statement fails to explain why delivery is something other
than simply evidence of the necessary "taking."
39. See Pound, supra note 33, at 1057 (In Cochrane, "[Tihe history of legal institutions
and legal doctrines is relied upon to give us a conception or a principle from which the rule
for a particular situation may be reached.").
1989]
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need for "cogent evidence" 4 of gifts to prevent fraud. 4' However persuasive
these efforts, they are admittedly post hoc.42 The delivery requirement may
have persisted for functional reasons, but it is not at all clear that it
originated in them.
2. Wills
The development of the modern will in England is difficult to trace
through the complications created by the rise of feudalism and primogeniture
and the separation of ecclesiastic from secular courts following the Norman
Conquest.43 It is clear, however, that testaments of personalty, under su-
pervision of the ecclesiastical courts, were established by the 13th century
and that post-mortem disposition of realty could be controlled by the
feoffment to uses by the end of the 14th century. 44 Yet the formalities
which are now associated with wills arose much later, in the 16th and 17th
centuries. As with the delivery formality in the case of gifts, there is no
clear causal connection between the imposition of execution formalities and
the functions currently offered to justify them.
The first formality to be imposed was the requirement of a writing,
enacted through the Statute of Wills in 1540.41 The absence of any require-
ment of witnesses suggests little concern for the ritual or protective functions.
Though writings help serve the evidentiary function, the statute does not
appear to have been primarily concerned with ensuring evidentiary reliability.
The required writing did not have to be in the testator's handwriting, and
it did not need to bear the testator's signature.
The historical context of the Statute of Wills suggests that the statute
was enacted primarily to counteract the effects of the Statute of Uses.4
Medieval doctrine held that land could be transferred only by livery of
seisin and thus prevented devises of land. 47 The Statute of Uses effectively
40. Stone, supra note 18, at 197.
41. Labatt, The Inconsistencies of the Laws of Gifts, 29 AM. U. L. REv. 361, 365 (1895).
These attempts to provide an explanation for the delivery requirement came to fruition in
Mechem's article, see infra text accompanying notes 58-99.
42. Labatt, supra note 41, at 365; Mechem, supra note 4, at 346; Stone, supra note 18,
at 197.
43. Post-mortem disposition-through the post-obit gift, the death-bed distribution, and
the cwide-was possible as early as the Anglo-Saxon period, though it is not clear that any
of these devices had the revocable or ambulatory qualities associated with modern wills. On
the general history of the English will, see T. ATKiNsON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WLS
11-23 (2d ed. 1953); 2 F. POLLACK & F. MArrLAND, Tan HIsToRY OF ENGLISH LAW 314-56 (2d
ed. 1898 repr. 1978); A. RE PY & L.J. Tom'KINs, HisTogIcAL AN STATUTORY BACKROuND
OF rm LAw OF Wrius (1928).
44. T. ATK SON, supra note 43, at 14.
45. Wills Act, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, ch. 1.
46. An Act Covering Uses and Wills (Statute of Uses), 1535, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 10.
47. T. ATKncsoN, supra note 43, at 14.
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eliminated the mechanism commonly employed to evade this restriction, the
feoffment to uses. 48 It was the gentry's resulting protest over the loss of
post-mortem control of land, and not the perceived need for additional
formality, that led to the enactment of the Statute of Wills. 49
More than a century elapsed before the enactment of the Statute of
Frauds,50 which imposed the bulk of the formal requirements now so familiar
to us, including signature and attestation of witnesses.51 In contrast to the
Statute of Wills, the Statute of Frauds seems to have been designed in part
with the functions of form in mind. The original bill was "[an act for
preventing many fraudulent practices which are commonly endeavored to
be upheld by perjury, and subornation of perjury." '5 2 At least one of the
amendments to the original act was offered in response to the infamous
48. Atkinson provides the following illustration:
If A conveyed land to B to the use of C, courts of law recognized B as the
owner and would not compel him to perform the use. Chancery, however, would
intervene and require B to account to C in accordance with the terms of the use.
By the latter part of the fourteenth century it came to be the practice for A to
enfeoff B for the use of such person as A might appoint. The instrument of
appointment, enforceable in equity, performed the function of a will.
Id. at 14. See also A. REPPY & L.J. ToManiNs, supra note 43, at 14. Thus owners of land
were able to control post-mortem disposition notwithstanding restrictions upon devises and
without the feudal prerequisite of livery of seisin.
49. T. ATusoN, supra note 43, at 14; Reppy, The Ordinance of William the Conqueror-
Its Implications in the Modern Law of Succession, 42 Ky. L.J. 522, 534 (1953); see also J.
H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLiSH LEGAL HIsToRY 217-18 (2d ed. 1979) ("[The Statute
of Uses] ... imposed compulsory primogeniture on a society which had accustomed itself to
greater flexibility .... Lawyers immediately set about finding loop-holes [sic], and landowners
set about demanding the repeal of the statute. Within four years, . . .the king restored to
the landowner the power to devise land."); S.F.C. MsoM, HISTORicAL FOUNDATIONS OF 'rE
CosotON LAW 221 (2d ed. 1981) (the effect of the Statute of Uses was "intolerable, and in
1540 there was passed the Statute of Wills restoring a power of devise") (footnote omitted).
The historical record does not make clear why a writing was required.
50. Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3. On the general history of the Statute of
Frauds, see 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 379-97 (2d ed. 1937); A.W.B.
SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF rm COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 599-620 (1975).
51. The Statute of Frauds required that wills of real property be (i) in writing, (ii) signed
by the testator or by one who, in the presence of the testator, acted according to the testator's
direction, and (iii) attested by three or four credible witnesses. Written wills could be revoked
in one of only three ways: (i) by another will or codicil executed according to the same
formalities as were required for written wills of real property; (ii) by a writing, signed by the
testator in the presence of three or four credible witnesses, declaring the will revoked; or (iii)
by destruction or obliteration of the will by the testator or by one who, in the presence of
the testator, acts according to the testator's direction and consent. Statute of Frauds, 1677,
29 Car. 2, ch. 3, §§ 5, 6. See also 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 50, at 385. The statute did
not apply to wills of personal property in the amount of 30 pounds or less, or to the oral
wills of soldiers in actual military service or mariners at sea. Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car.
2, ch. 3, §§ 19, 23. But for restrictions upon oral wills of personal property exceeding 30
pounds, see Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, §§ 19, 20.
52. 12 JouirNAL OF Tim HousE OF LoRDs 638, quoted in 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note
50, at 380.
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case of Cole v. Mordaunt,5 3 which involved perjured testimony that a
testator's written will containing substantial devises to charities had been
orally revoked by a nuncupative will in favor of the testator's wife.
54
Yet while there is strong evidence of a concern for evidentiary and
protective functions at the time the Statute of Frauds was enacted, historians
have identified an additional, unrelated, influence on the enactment of the
statute: the need for judicial control over juries. At the time the statute
was passed, the institution of trial by jury was in a state of transition, with
the jury free to decide a case on its own knowledge of the facts, apart
from the evidence and contrary to the directions of the court.5 5 By making
certain kinds of evidence necessary for the proof of certain transactions,
the Statute of Frauds effectively barred juries from reaching conclusions as
to whether documents before them were wills or contracts in the absence
of such evidence. The statute thus placed "a limitation on the uncontrolled
discretion of the jury. ' 56 This explanation suggests that the drafters' aims
may have been procedural as well as facilitative.
In summary, the power of post-mortem disposition existed in England
for centuries before being subject to any formal requirements. The first
formality to be imposed, the requirement of a writing, appeared in a statute
enacted chiefly to restore the power to devise land, not to enhance eviden-
tiary reliability. It was not until the passage of the Statute of Frauds in
1677 that there was any mention of the need for formalities to combat
fraud and perjury. Even then, there is some historical evidence to suggest
that the impetus for the statute arose as much out of procedural concerns
related to jury control as it did out of concern for the protection of
testamentary intent.5 7
53. Unpublished case decided May 22, 1676 (28 Car. 11 1676), discussed in Mathew v.
Warner, 31 Eng. Rep. 96, 107 n.2 (1798).
54. Id. For a discussion of Cole, and its influence upon the Statute of Frauds, see A.
REPPY & L.J. TompKns , supra note 43, at 9. For background on the Statute of Frauds
generally, see Hening, The Original Drafts of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. I C. 3) and
Their Authors, 61 U. PA. L. Rav. 283 (1913).
55. 6 W. HoLDswoRTit, supra note 50, at 388. See also G. CHMssn & C. Fl'OOT, THE
LAw OF CONTRACT 174 (9th ed. 1976); A.W.B. SnArsoN, supra note 50, at 604-05.
56. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 50, at 388. See also Friedman, supra note 3, at 753-
55 (mandatory rules, which allow no leeway to the ifiterpreter, enhance the "autonomy" of
written documents, binding the interpreter to the legal import of the words used in the
document).
57. It is possible to understand the development of the formal requirements in a quite
different way from that proposed here. To put things in the simplest possible terms: In the
feudal era, when realty was the only asset of real value, all transfers of land required livery
of seisin. Livery served all the functions of form, whether it was meant to do so or not. The
Statute of Uses ended the need for livery and permitted new modes for conveying realty, e.g.,
the bargain and sale deed. Thereafter, parties and courts were confronted with problems that
had never arisen when livery was required-problems of perjury, fraud, evidence and the like.
As these problems became perceptible, courts and legislatures responded, over time developing
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B. The Assumptions Underlying the Functional Justification
Those who have been most influential in proposing a functional expla-
nation for the formalities of donative transfers do not base their arguments
on the historical origins of the formal requirements. Instead, they assert
that "well founded ... considerations of policy lie behind the require-
ment[s]." 8 The formalities, they argue, "should not be revered as ends in
themselves"; 9 rather, they "seem justifiable only as implements for [the]
accomplishment"0 of the "primary" 61 objective of the law of donative
transfers, which is to give effect to any intentional exercise of an owner's
power to determine his successors in ownership. 62
Functional explanations of formal requirements are scattered through
Anglo-American cases and treatises from the 17th century onward. 63 Yet
the functional justification received its most striking-and most influential-
expression in articles published in America early in the 20th century,
primarily Mechem's The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels64 and
Gulliver and Tilson's Classification of Gratuitous Transfers.65 As these
articles contain what has now become the standard explanation of the
functions of form in donative transfers law, they warrant close examination.
The purpose of both articles was, in a sense, anti-formalist: to demonstrate
that transfers could and should be upheld, despite failure to comply literally
with formal requirements, if the functions usually served by formalities were
requirements designed to meet them.
There is no historical evidence either to support or to contradict this understanding. While
the historical events can be read this way, the question is whether they ought to be so read.
The point of the text's discussion is that that question is an open one. It is at least possible
that we are inclined to read the historical development of formality in functional terms only
because the functionalist rational is both familiar and appealing to us as 20th century thinkers.
On this view, the expectation that the Cochrane court or the drafters of the wills' formalities
would speak in functional terms is an arguably unreasonable imposition of a 20th century
functional perspective on thinkers who did not share that tradition.
58. Mechem, supra note 4, at 342. Mechem argued that he was "not in substance urging
new doctrine, but ... only reducing to fundamentals the considerations that have, in fact,
actuated the decision of courts." Id. at 355.
59. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 4, at 3.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2; see also E. CLARi, L. LusKy & A. MuRHY, GRATuous TRANsFERs 1 (3d
ed. 1985) ("[In] a capitalist economy based on the institution of private property, owners have
the widest possible latitude in disposing of their property in accordance with their own wishes
whether they be wise or foolish. The statutes and cases in the field have as their purpose the
discovery of the true intent of the property owner, not to thwart it, but to give it effect.").
63. See, e.g., Adams, 24 N.C. (2 Ired.) at 301; Noble, 2 Johns. 52; W. THORNTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATiNG TO GIns AND ADVANCEMENTS 106-08 (1893); 2 W. BLAcKsToNE,
COMMENTARIES *441.
64. Mechem, supra note 4.
65. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 4; Fuller's Consideration and Form, supra note 8, which
discussed the functions of form in the context of contract law, was also highly influential.
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otherwise performed in the circumstances of the transfer.66 The articles
identified two major functions ordinarily served by form, and Gulliver and
Tilson discussed a third, which they clearly saw as less important. 67 The
first, the ritual function, involves "the performance of some ceremonial for
the purpose of impressing the transferor with the significance of his state-
ments and thus justifying the court in reaching the conclusion, if the
ceremonial is performed, that they were deliberately intended to be opera-
tive." 68 The second function of form is evidentiary. "[T]he existing require-
ments of transfer emphasize the purpose of supplying satisfactory evidence
to the court." '6 9 The third function is protective. "[S]ome of the requirements
of the [statutes of wills] have the stated prophylactic purpose of safeguarding
the testator, at the time of the execution of the will, against undue influence
or other forms of imposition." '70
There is no denying the popularity and appeal of Mechem's and Gulliver
and Tilson's formulation; excerpts from their articles appear in almost every
trusts and estates casebook, 71 and much of contemporary scholarship in the
trusts and estates field assesses disputed donative transfers in functional
terms. 72 Yet little attention has been paid to the assumptions underlying
their argument. These assumptions are critical. The functional explanation
asserts that ritual, reliable evidence, and protection (which are usually
supplied by formalities, but which may be supplied by other means) are
necessary. They are necessary because of the way people are. The functional
justification thus depends on a vision of human nature and interaction, an
image of the way we "are." The articles offer such a vision, making many
conclusory statements about what people will or will not do if unchecked
by formalities. As the influence and appeal of the articles depends in some
measure on this vision, it is worth describing in depth.
66. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 4, at 17; Mechem, supra note 4, at 342.
67. The third function, protection of the testator, was discussed dismissively by Gulliver
& Tilson, and not at all by Mechem. The fourth function, the channelling function, is discussed
(in connection with wills) by Langbein, supra note 4, who attributes it to Fuller (who discussed
it in connection with contracts). The need for the channelling function was recognized iihplicitly
by Gulliver & Tilson in their discussion of the distance of courts from events. See infra text
accompanying notes 85-99.
68. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 4, at 4; see also Mechem, supra note 4, at 348 ("[D]elivery
makes vivid and concrete to the donor the significance of the act he is doing.").
69. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 4, at 4; see also Mechem, supra note 4, at 349 ("[Ihe
fact of delivery gives the donee . . . at least prima facie evidence in favor of the alleged
gift.").
70. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 4, at 4-5.
71. See, e.g., E. CLARK, L. LUSKY & A. MuRPHY, supra note 62, at 265-69; J. DUKEMn4INR
& S. JOH-ANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 183-85 (3d ed. 1984); E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH,
DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 131-34 (4th ed. 1987).
72. See, e.g., Browder, Giving or Leaving-What is a Will?, 75 MICH. L. REv. 845 (1977);
Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 7; McGovern, The Payable on Death
Account and Other Will Substitutes, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 7 (1972).
[Vol. 64:155
GIFTS, BARGAINS, AND FORM
1. Ritual
"People are often careless in conversation and in informal writings."
'
"1 It
is to prevent such carelessness, wrote Gulliver and Tilson, that ritual is
needed. Mechem agreed: "The wrench of delivery . . . is an important
element to the protection of the donor. If . . . he hardly understands
himself just what he means . . .he cannot fail to understand . . .when
he hands over the property." 7 4 "[A] moment's acute consideration" is
necessary to protect the "thoughtless and hasty" donor from improvidence."1
The picture is clear. People "are" imprudent and careless. Without an
external check, our decisions to give are hasty and unconsidered. A ceremony
is needed to safeguard us from our apparent propensity for unexamined
generosity.
2. Evidence
Since most disputes concerning donative transfers arise after the death of
the alleged donor, 76 the best source of evidence concerning the transaction
is invariably unavailable. We are forced in contested cases to rely on evidence
of circumstances and on the testimony of witnesses. Mechem and Gulliver
and Tilson found this reliance to be problematic for several reasons.
First, our own conduct as donors is difficult to interpret. "What did the
donor say? What did he mean? . . . Perhaps he hesitated and contradicted
himself so that the outcome of his thought was not readily to be ascertained
by witnesses in the flurry of the moment. ' 77 An act "readily and naturally
susceptible of but one" interpretation is necessary to settle the "many
doubts" witnesses would otherwise have.7 8
The inherent ambiguity of our conduct is perhaps the least troubling part
of the problem. More serious is the fact that, as witnesses, we forget and
we lie. Gulliver and Tilson put it in gentle terms:
[IThe inaccuracies of oral testimony owing to lapse of memory, misin-
terpretation of the statements of others, and the more or less unconscious
coloring of recollection in the light of the personal interest of the witness
or of those with whom he is friendly, are very prevalent; and the
possibilities of perjury and forgery cannot be disregarded. 7'
73. Gulliver & TiIson,. supra note 4, at 3.
74. Mechem, supra note 4, at 348 (emphasis in original).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 350 n.23; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 4, at 4 n.4.
77. Mechem, supra note 4, at 349.
78. Id.
79. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 4, at 4.
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Mechem found the delivery requirement particularly apt as an antidote to
donee perjury: "It is easier to fabricate a story than to abstract the
property. '80
Again the picture is clear. At best, people "are" equivocal in their words
and conduct; at worst, people "are" prone to be forgetful, inaccurate, and
potentially dishonest. Reliable objective evidence is needed because those
who survive the donor cannot be trusted to recount faithfully or truly what
the donor said and did. We cannot be trusted, this vision implicitly asserts,
because we "are" selfish. We will misinterpret, misremember, and misrep-
resent to obtain more for ourselves and our friends.
3. Protection
The selfishness that makes us unreliable as witnesses could have even
worse consequences. We might seek to impose our will on the testator to
compel a disposition in our favor. Some of the formal requirements appli-
cable to will execution are, "according to judicial interpretation," meant
to protect testators from such imposition. 81 Gulliver and Tilson were openly
skeptical about the protective function on multiple grounds. The protective
formalities had too often been used to invalidate wills that were not in fact
"improper or suspicious"; they were of only doubtful effectiveness, and
they were anomalous in that no similar formalities applied to inter vivos
transfers.82 Yet if the formalities designed to ensure protection of testators
were unnecessary, it was not because imposition was actually unlikely.
Rather, it was because circumstances suggested that testators "as a class"
were in an excellent position to resist pressure. "[A]s the owners of property,
earned or inherited, they are likely to be among the more capable and
dominant members of our society." 83 Gulliver and Tilson's ultimate rejection
of the protective function was thus consistent with the view that, as donees,
people "are" selfish and grasping.
4. Ability to Understand One Another
The assumptions thus far identified pertain primarily to the "private"
side of formalities; they focus on those aspects of human nature that
threaten clear expression of the donor's individually chosen ends. The
arguments of Mechem and Gulliver and Tilson also reflect assumptions
about the difficulties of reliable communication between individuals in
society. These difficulties pose problems for the judicial implementation
80. Mechem, supra note 4, at 349 (citation omitted).
81. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 4, at 9.
82. Id.
83. Id. Moreover, wills can be revoked. Id.
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and administration of gifts, and thus pertain to the "public" side of
formalities.84
When Mechem proposed that donor conduct was ambiguous, 5 he high-
lighted not only the equivocation of donors but the difficulties faced by
witnesses confronted with equivocal conduct. Delivery, he said, does more
than "mak[e] vivid and concrete to the donor the significance of the act
he is doing" 6; "the act of manual tradition is as unequivocal to actual
witnesses of the transaction as to the donor himself. ' 87 Without unequivocal,
objective acts, people "are" doomed to misunderstand each other.
Gulliver and Tilson were more optimistic about the possibility of accurate
interpretation of face-to-face interactions: "If all transfers were required to
be made before the court determining their validity, it is probable that no
formalities except oral declarations in the presence of the court would be
necessary. The court could observe the transferor, hear his statements, and
clear up ambiguities by appropriate questions." 8 Yet however accurately a
court might interpret events if it had firsthand knowledge of them, such
knowledge is unavailable as a practical matter. "Our judicial agencies are
remote from the actual or fictitious occurrences relied on by the various
claimants to the property, and so must accept second hand information,
perhaps ambiguous, perhaps innocently misleading, perhaps deliberately
falsified . . . ."9 The human propensity to err or to lie is not alone the
problem; it is the court's inability to explore errors and falsifications that
necessitates objective evidence substituting for these inquiries.
From quite divergent starting points, Mechem and Gulliver and Tilson
end up in a similar place, agreeing that an individual donor's true intentions
are-either inherently or structurally-inaccessible to courts in the absence
of the tangible evidence formalities produce. This observation is important
in light of a second, independent, observation: "The inventiveness and
variety of inclination of human beings often produce situations not readily
identifiable in terms of recognized legal patterns."' 9
84. The last three sections have focused on the "private" side of the ritual, evidentiary,
and protective functions-on the needs and attributes that threaten the formulation and
expression of individual intent. The three functions previously discussed have a "public"
dimension as well. Society as a whole presumably benefits if individuals' decisions are carefully
deliberated and made without pressure, and judicial administration is simplified if evidence is
clear and reliable. To the extent that the evidentiary function in particular is justified in terms
of these "public," administrative concerns, it relies upon the same assumptions as are identified
here with reference to the channelling function.
85. See text accompanying note 77.
86. Mechem, supra note 4, at 348.
87. Id. at 349.
88. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 4, at 3.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1.
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Fortunately, "[s]ome human actions fit rather neatly into legal categories
... ,"91 For example, Mechem suggested that "under normal circum-
stances" the idea of a gift includes the idea of transfer of possession,92 and
it was, he argued, for that reason93 that delivery was required "[i]n the
ordinary case. ' 94 Similarly, Gulliver and Tilson suggested that it was because
of "the usual custom in a literate era of signing documents with a complete
name" that the wills acts required signatures. 9
Yet both articles recognize that "exceptional ' 96 cases frequently occur.
Indeed the purpose of each article was to argue that the formal requirements
so apt in the "normal" cases should not be inflexibly applied to these
atypical circumstances, i.e., that since many human actions do not fit neatly
into legal categories, the courts should avoid over-reliance on formal clas-
sification.
Both articles thus assume that while legal rules can and often do reflect
the way people commonly behave, they do not invariably do so. The latter
situation is particularly troubling in light of the inability of courts under
the best of circumstances to gain an accurate view of individual intentions.
Though neither article specifically discussed the channelling function of
formalities, 97 their assumptions demonstrated the need for "uniformity"
and "standardization" 98 of donative transfers in order to eliminate inevitable
judicial confusion. Because people "are" unpredictable and only sometimes
capable of conforming their behavior to legal categories, courts need for-
malities if they are to understand us.9
C. Some Reasons to Question the Functionalists' Assumptions
The functionalists argue that the formalities of donative transfers are in
most instances rational responses to real human needs, to the way people
"are."' 0 The needs are seen as pre-existing the formal rules, which function
91. Id.
92. Mechem, supra note 4, at 347.
93. Id. at 346, 349, 353.
94. Id. at 353.
95. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 4, at 7.
96. Mechem, supra note 4, at 353.
97. Fuller, supra note 8, at 801-03; Langbein, supra note 4, at 493-94.
98. Langbein, supra note 4, at 494.
99. The channelling function does not serve a solely "public" function; it also effectuates
the donor's intent. See id.
100. It bears repeating that the functionalists' primary aim was not to set forth a vision of
human nature, but rather to propose a sound policy to guide the application of the formal
rules of donative transfers. See supra text accompanying notes 66, 96. It was only in the
course of explaining the relevant policies that they identified behavioral traits making the rules(or some substitute for the rules) necessary. Yet the traits to which they refer are treated as
given: For example, no citation is offered to support Gulliver and Tilson's assertion that
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to meet (or neutralize) them. Whatever the historical origin of the rules,
they have survived because of the needs, and if we had different needs-if
the rules did not'respond to the way people "are"-we would surely have
different rules.
The functionalists' assumptions can be questioned. For .one thing, they
are difficult to reconcile with one another. On the one hand, in connection
with the ritual function, people are seen as prone to quick, unconsidered
generosity. Simultaneously, on the other hand, in connection with the
evidentiary function, they are seen as selfish and grasping. 10 The latter
vision is difficult to reconcile not only with the former, but also with the
familial context in which gifts are often presumed to be made. The family
setting has traditionally been associated with values of sharing and sacrifice,
not with self-interest.10
More important, intriguing evidence from the social sciences suggests that
the functionalist account is simplistic and misleading. Take, for example,
the assumption that people "are" selfish. Psychologists have grappled
repeatedly with the observation that "for most adults in our society the
"[p]eople are often careless in conversation and in informal writings." Gulliver & Tilson,
supra note 4, at 3.
It could be argued that, in identifying the human qualities with which the rules were
concerned (carelessness, selfishness, unpredictability and the like), the functionalists were
focusing on the behavior not of all or most people but a few "irresponsible" or "unscrupulous"
persons. That is, it is possible that the functionalists were arguing (or should be understood
to be arguing) that the functions of form are necessary in light of problems that arise at the
margin due to the behavior of an unrepresentative subset of the population.
Of course, this is not what the functionalists said; their assertions about "people," "donors,"
and "witnesses" tend to be unqualified, as is illustrated by the quotation from Gulliver and
Tilson above. See also Mechem, supra note 4, at 348 (describing attributes of "the lay . . .
proposition that a gift has been made") (emphasis supplied). To the extent that they considered
the matter at all, the functionalists seem to view the behavioral traits they identified as
temptations or errors to which all persons are susceptible even if all do not succumb. See,
e.g., text accompanying note 79.
The bleakness of the picture of human nature emerging from the functionalist account is
not significantly reduced by characterizing the human qualities necessitating formal rules as
"potential" rather than "actual." In any event, if the formalities are directed at a small
subgroup of the general population, they seem obviously overbroad. For example, they have
the potential to bar enforcement of carefully considered as well as implusive gifts, or to prevent
the receipt of honest as well as perjured testimony.
101. Impulsiveness and selfishness are not necessarily inconsistent; impulsive acts of gener-
osity may be motivated by selfish expectations of some future gift in return. See infra text
accompanying note 105. Yet the functionalists seem to assume, in connection with the ritual
function, that donors, unless restrained, will give too much away without devoting sufficient
thought to the matter. That assumption seems at odds with the assumption of selfishness
because at least one understanding of what it means to be selfish is that the selfish person
never gives without considering "what's in it for me."
102. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study.of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv.
L. REv. 1497, 1505 (1983). As Olsen points out, this characterization of family life may be
extremely questionable. The point here is that there is a gap between the functionalists'
assumptions about human nature in giving and commonly held (albeit possibly inaccurate)
views of family life.
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greater part of their efforts are designed manifestly to benefit others
.... -103 by giving to the poor, caring for children, risking their lives in
war, helping fellow shoppers who have dropped their grocery bags, or the
like.' 4 It is perfectly possible, of course, that we "are bad," at least in
some measure, and yet for various independent reasons "do good." Indeed,
it is often suggested that generous acts are performed for what are, at
bottom, purely or truly selfish reasons.'0 5 Yet the fact that, "for the most
part, people do not act in obviously self-serving ways. . ."106 is problematic
for the assumption that people "are" basically selfish, and the view that
self-regarding motives are the real source of altruistic behavior is, in the
end, "just an ad hoc hypothesis, not evidence ... .1,,07
In fact, empirical "evidence"' 0 8 derived from studies of kidney donations
raises substantial questions concerning the functionalists' assumption that
people "are" selfish.'0 9 The studies were undertaken in the context of
considerable medical skepticism that donors would freely choose, absent
intense family pressure or guilt, to threaten their own health and safety in
the interest of others." 0 They found, however, that a "surprisingly large
percentage of all persons who could have volunteered to donate a kidney,
actually did offer to do so.""' The conclusion of the studies' authors was
103. Lerner & Meindl, Justice and Altruism, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAviOR: SOCIAL,
PERSONALITY, AND DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES 213, 220 (J. Rushton & R. Sorrentino eds.
1981) (emphasis in original).
104. Id. at 213.
105. See Cohen, Altruism: Human, Cultural, or What?, in ALTRUISM, SYMPATHY, AND
HELPING: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PINCIpLEs 79, 82-83 (L. Wispe ed. 1978) (noting
a "hedonistic paradox": "even the most unselfish act may produce a psychological reward
for the actor"); Lerner & Meindl, supra note 103, at 213 (the conventional explanation of
acts that help others is that they are performed out of self-interest, with the benefits to others
being secondary and incidental); Hoffman, The Development of Empathy, in ALTRUIsM AND
HELPING BEHAviOR: SOCIAL, PERSONALITY, ANiD DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES 41 (J. Rushton
& R. Sorrentino eds. 1981) ("The doctrinaire view in psychology has long been that altruism
can ultimately be explained in terms of egoistic, self-serving motives.").
106. Lerner & Meindl, supra note 103, at 220 (emphasis in original).
107. Hoffman, supra note 105, at 41. Because altruistic acts are so difficult to square with
the theory that individuals are basically selfish, psychologists have struggled to explain them.
We need these explanations only if the acts themselves are puzzling.
108. I refer here not to psychological experiments, but to studies of actual patterns of
giving. In addition to the studies discussed below, see J. ROSENFELD, THE LEGACY OF AGING:
INHERITANCE AND DISINHERITANCE IN SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE (1979); R. Trrmuss, THE GIFT
RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SociAL PoLIcy (1971).
109. R. Fox & J. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE TO FAIL: A SocIAL Vmw OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS
AND DIALYSIS (1974); R. SIMMONS, S. KLEiN & R. SIMMrONs, GiFT OF LIE: THE SOCIAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION (1977) [hereinafter R. SIMMONS]; Fellner
& Marshall, Kidney Donors, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 269 (J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz eds.
1970).
110. R. SInMoNS, supra note 109, at 153.
111. Id. at 203. The actual number was 57%. See also Fellner & Schwartz, Altruism in
Disrepute, 284 NEw ENG. J. MED. 582 (1971) (suggesting that a surprisingly high number of
strangers would volunteer to donate kidneys as well).
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that "individuals find meaningful altruistic acts deeply rewarding intrinsi-
cally.""12
Not only did the studies show a surprisingly unselfish willingness to give,
they also revealed a noteworthy absence of pressure to donate. Only a small
percentage of donors reported feeling direct family pressure,"' and though
reports of more subtle pressure were common, for most donors that pressure
seemed to make the decision to give easier rather than harder: "The
obligation to sacrifice for one's family was widely accepted as legitimate
among those donors .... .1"4 These findings are problematic for the
assumption, underlying the protective function, that donees will seek to
grasp by possibly illegitimate means what would not otherwise be willingly
given. Donees and their families were not grasping, and even in the face
of those pressures that were exerted, donors did not feel that they donated
under duress." 5
In addition to raising questions about the functionalists' assumptions of
selfishness and pressure, the studies of kidney donors also suggest questions
about the assumption of over-zealous giving which underlies the ritual
function. The studies did confirm that rather than making "an objective
and impartial evaluation of the merits of the alternatives," kidney donors
"made an immediate major decision, before even inquiring into the possible
consequences for themselves . "...1116 Yet they also found that "most
donors themselves feel comfortable, probably more comfortable, without
extensive deliberation" "1 and that few donors experience significant regrets
afterward." 8 Rather, donors' happiness and self-esteem rise after donation." 9
These findings suggest that even if people "are" as impulsive as the
functionalists assumed, that impulsiveness may not pose the sort of "dan-
ger" or "threat" worth averting. 20
112. R. SIMMONS, supra note 109, at 445.
113. Id. at 431.
114. Id.
115. But see Simmons, Hickey, Kjellstrand & Simmons, Family Tension in the Search for
a Kidney Donor, 215 J. A.M.A. 909 (1971), suggesting that the decisionmaking process of
eligible donors who did not choose to donate was much less smooth than that of those who
did choose to donate.
116. Fellner & Marshall, supra note 109, at 278; see also R. SDMONS, supra note 109, at
283-84 ("IT]he majority of donors (61%) appear to have known instantaneously that they
would give the gift, and they report no conscious period of deliberation.").
117. R. SIMMONS, supra note 109, at 285.
118. Id. at 431; Fellner & Marshall, supra note 109, at 276.
119. R. SMMONS, supra note 109, at 432; Fellner & Marshall, supra note 109, at 279.
120. In the functionalists' view, the ideal decision to give is made deliberately and without
any pressure; the emphasis is on individual freedom. The findings that actual donors made
their decisions immediately in response to pressures perceived to be legitimate suggests that
donors experience their decisions neither as totally free nor as theirs alone to make; the
emphasis, for some, is on community or familial obligation. In this context, the ritual and
protective formalities may operate to isolate donors from ties that are important to them-a
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In light of these findings, the studies' authors questioned whether the
physician's obligation to obtain informed consent, which-like the ritual
function of formalities-is designed to force donors to consider carefully
the act they are about to undertake, was properly tailored to donors' actual
decision-making processes.' 2' The questions the studies raised have impli-
cations not only for the need for ritual, but also for the functionalists'
assumptions concerning the need for channelling. The functionalists argued
that channelling is required because courts will otherwise have difficulty
sorting complicated human behavior into proper legal categories. The chan-
nelling function recognizes that human behavior will not always fit neatly
into legal categories, but it assumes that one or another of the available
categories will correspond in reasonable measure to most individuals' inten-
tions; channelling forces individuals to denote clearly which category they
have chosen. The studies' results, however, suggest that the legal categories
into which conduct is sought to be channelled may not correspond in any
meaningful fashion to the way in which that conduct is experienced by the
actors involved. In such circumstances, channelling will compound, not
resolve, problems of communication between individuals and courts by
forcing individuals to opt among legal categories that do not in fact reflect
their intentions.
The studies of kidney donations were not designed to prove or disprove
broad claims about giving or human nature generally. However, their
findings suggest that there is a reality other than that described by the
functionalists-that, at least in some contexts, people "are" quite different
from the way the functionalists saw them. These findings are significant
because they go to the root of the functional justification of form. If
humans do not have the needs identified by the functionalists, then what
purpose do the formalities serve?
These observations form an important backdrop for the second ground
on which the functionalists' assumptions can be challenged. Even without
contesting the existence of the needs the functionalists described, it is
important to question their vision that the needs pre-exist and give rise to
the formal rules. An alternative view is that legal rules do not simply reflect
reality-the way things or people "are"-but help to create it by limiting
what we can imagine about ourselves and what is possible for us.'2 The
function of debatable value. The idea that formalities and the functions of form may not
merely reflect the "reality" of individual decisionmaking but help to create it is developed
infra at text accompanying notes 122-35.
121. Fellner & Marshall, supra note 109, at 280.
122. See generally Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITcs oF LAw:
A PRoGREssrE CRUiQjuE 281, 287 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) ("Law, like religion . . . , is one of
these clusters of belief . . . that convince people that all the many hierarchical relations in
which they live and work are natural and necessary."); Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36
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functional justification of formalities can be understood as a "structure of
consciousness," i.e., "a shared vision of the social universe that underlies
a society's culture and also shapes the society's view of what social rela-
tionships are 'natural' and, therefore, what social reforms are possible."'' n
There is some empirical evidence to suggest that this is more than a
theoretical possibility. In a pioneering study contrasting the safety and
frequency of blood donation in England and the United States, 124 Richard
Titmuss concluded that "[tihe forms and functions of giving embody moral,
social, psychological, religious, legal and aesthetic ideas . . . .They may
contribute to integrative processes in a society (binding together different
ethnic, religious and generational groups) or they may spread, through
separatist and segregationist acts, the reality and sense of alienation ...."121
The voluntary donation of blood is, in Titmuss' view, "the closest
approximation in social reality to the abstract concept of a 'free human
gift," 26 undertaken without contract or compulsion, without expectation
of reward or penalty, and without knowledge of the beneficiary. 127 Titmuss
found disturbing differences between patterns of blood donation in England,
where donation is made on a voluntary basis through the National Health
Service, and in the United States, where "the trend appears to be markedly
in the direction of increasing commercialization of blood and donor rela-
tionships.' '1 28 American systems of paid donations and commercial blood
banking result, Titmuss found, in a disproportionately poor and unskilled
donor population, 29 a less safe blood supply, 30 and in greater shortages of
blood.' On this basis, he roundly criticized a market system for blood3 2
and praised the National Health Service,' concluding that "the ways in
which society organizes and structures its social institutions-and particularly
STAN. L. REv. 57, 111 (1984) ("[Ihe legal forms we use set limits on what we can imagine
as practical options .... [They] condition not just our power to get what we want but what
we want (or think we can get) itself."); see also Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of
Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 999 (1985) ("Law, like every other cultural institution,
is a place where we tell one another stories about our relationships with ourselves, one another,
and authority .... Since our stories influence how we imagine, as well as how we describe,
our relationships, our stories also limit who we can be.") (citation omitted).
123. Olsen, supra note 102, at 1497-98.
124. R. Trra uss, supra note 108.
125. Id. at 71.
126. Id. at 88.
127. Id. at 88-89.
128. Id. at 119.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 143-57.
131. Id. at 157.
132. Id. at 198-99, 213, 242. Economists have challenged Titmuss' critique of the market.
See, e.g., Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 Pim. & PuB. Ass. 343 (1972); Kessel, Transfused
Blood, Serum Hepatitis, and the Coase Theorem, 17 J. L. & EcoN. 265 (1974); Solow, Blood
and Thunder, 80 YAlE L.J. 1696 (1971).
133. R. Trmuss, supra note 108, at 225.
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its health and welfare systems-can encourage or discourage the altruistic
in man; such systems can foster integration or alienation ... 134
Like the studies of kidney donations, Titmuss' study was confined to a
relatively narrow context and may be an inappropriate basis for generali-
zations concerning the way people "are." 1 35 Yet his conclusions have pow-
erful implications for the functionalists' assumptions. While the functionalists
assert that the human needs they described exist prior to and as a basis for
the rules that serve them, Titmuss' study suggests that, at least in some
situations, those rules may have a hand in defining or creating those needs.
Formalities make giving more difficult; by discouraging giving, they may
encourage the very selfishness they are, in the functionalists' view, designed
to combat. Of course, it is no more fair to say that people "are" altruistic
in the absence of formal rules than it is to say that people "are" selfish in
the absence of formal checks. The point is that it may be impossible to say
anything very credible about the way people "are" in the abstract because
part of what determines how and what we "are" is the rules to which we
are subject. 36
As the functionalists themselves acknowledged, 37 our legal system is
committed, at least ostensibly, to permitting individuals to decide whether
and to whom they should give. Other systems are possible. The civil law
regime of forced heirship limits owners' freedom to make gifts,'38 and one
could imagine a society in which property owned at death was collected by
the state for distribution to the needy rather than distributed in accordance
with individuals' wills. 139 The private decisions to which our legal system
134. Id. Titmuss' conclusions that the market system produces less safe blood and discourages
altruism have been challenged, as have some of the empirical data on which he based those
conclusions. See supra note 132.
The empirical questions concerning the accuracy of Titmuss' data now seem somewhat moot.
When Titmuss wrote, the chief threat to the safety of donated blood was hepatitis, and his
study of donors concentrated on the risk factors associated with that disease. Any accurate
account of the safety of donated blood today would presumably focus primarily on the risk
factors associated with AIDS.
The challenges to Titmuss' conclusions concerning the market have raised the possibility
that commercialism is not necessarily antithetical either to a safe blood supply or to altruism.
Those who argue, contrary to Titmuss, that markets facilitate-or at any rate do not reduce-
altruism implicitly concede Titmuss' claim that there is a connection between social institutions
and altruism. The economists seem to disagree with Titmuss only about which social institutions
(the market versus voluntarism) best promote altruism.
135. Titmuss believed his conclusions had implications in other contexts. See R. Trnmss,
supra note 108, at 215, 221, 224.
136. See Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 1129
(1986) (examining the relationship between rules of law and private preferences).
137. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 4, at 2; Langbein, supra note 4, at 491; Mechem, supra
note 4, at 350.
138. See infra text accompanying notes 206-16.
139. Whether complete abolition of the power of testation would be upheld under the
United States Constitution is another question. Compare Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076,
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chooses to give effect can have a significant economic impact on the
allocation of wealth; consider, for example, the testator whose primary asset
consists of a controlling block of shares in a major corporation.'14
It is in this context that the questions raised above about the functionalists'
assumptions must be understood. In a system committed to freedom of
disposition, why should we assume, as the functionalists do, that decisions
to give are suspect? In such a system, why should we impose requirements
that have the potential to frustrate individuals' wishes to give? A contract
may be made orally, 141 but a gift cannot. 142 If the legal system is prepared
to leave important wealth allocation decisions in private hands-as it pur-
ports to be with respect to contracts and donative transfers alike-the
functionalists do not explain convincingly why the law imposes the particular
requirements it does in the case of decisions to make gifts, or why it should
impose different requirements for gifts than it does for contracts. These
issues are explored in Part II.
II. GIrs AND CONSIDERATION
It has become commonplace to define gifts as transfers without consid-
eration.' 41 It is only when consideration is absent that the formalities of
delivery or of the wills acts are required; if consideration is present, the
transfer is by definition not a gift, and a different set of doctrinal require-
ments (looking to offer, acceptance and the like) applies. The consideration
doctrine is thus critical in demarking the line between gifts and bargains,
and the justifications offered for it shed light on the way in which the law
conceptualizes gifts.
Conventional approaches to the consideration doctrine seek to justify
consideration in terms of the larger goals of contract law. Like the law of
donative transfers, the law of contracts accords to individuals, in some
2084 (1987) ("[C]omplete abolition of both the descent and devise of a particular class of
property may be a taking . . . .") with Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942)
("Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or
even abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction.").
140. The extent to which donative transfers have economically significant effects on the
distribution of wealth is a matter of some dispute. See infra text accompanying note 174. The
issue has been explored primarily in the context of donative promises. See infra text accom-
panying notes 173-78. See also Fellows, Donative Promises Redux, in PROPERTY LAW AND
Lao JA EDUCATION 27 (P. Hay & M. Hoeflich eds. 1988).
141. Except, of course, for contracts within the Statute of Frauds.
142. R. BROWN, supra note 15, § 7.2, at 78.
143. See, e.g., Almeida v. Almeida, 4 Haw. App. 513, 669 P.2d 174 (1983); Stone v. Lynch,
312 N.C. 739, 325 S.E.2d 230 (1985); Matter of Estate of Carr, 99 A.D.2d 390, 473 N.Y.S.2d
179 (1984); In re Baptist Fellowship of Randolph Inc., 144 Vt. 636, 481 A.2d 1274 (1984).
For additional cases with similar definitions of "gift," see 38 AM. JUa. 2D Gifts § I nn.1, 3,
4 (1968); 38 C.J.S. Gifts § 1 n.1 (1943).
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measure, the power to determine their obligations to others,' 44 and, as is
true of the law of donative transfers, it must decide whether legal effect
should be given to all or only some of these individual determinations. That
decision depends on a combination of two factors: the ease and reliability
with which the court can ascertain what the private decision was (a matter
of form) and the social and economic importance the court accords to the
private decision (a matter of substance). 45
In the law of donative transfers, the decision to give effect to private
decision-making is said to be based primarily on form; a will not violative
of public policy is valid, regardless of the nature or wisdom of the testator's
wishes, as long as it is executed in compliance with the wills act.' 46 However,
contract law approaches private decision-making differently. It classifies
promises on substantive grounds first, differentiating between individual
decisions with important social or economic consequences and decisions
without such importance. The former are deemed to merit enforcement
without regard to form; the latter merit enforcement, if at all, only if made
formally.
The substantive function of the consideration requirement, in this view,
is to mark off acts and promises of sufficient inherent importance to
warrant legal intervention, regardless of form, from acts and promises which
lack such importance. 47 Executory bargains are said to be in the first
category, promises of gifts in the second. The justification of consideration
in substantive terms thus reflects the view not only that promises of bargains
and of gifts are fundamentally different, but also that the former are more
important than the latter.
If the substantive insignificance of gift promises explains why they should
be denied enforcement when made informally, it does not conclude the
question whether promises of gift should be enforced when their form
reliably establishes that they have actually been made. At least in theory,
formality can provide an independent, nonsubstantive ground for the en-
forcement of such promises, just as formality determines the enforceability
144. On contracts as private law-making, see Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L.
REv. 553, 586 (1933); Fuller, supra note 8, at 806; Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An
Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 729 (1931). On wills as private law-making, see supra
notes 4, 62. Private law-making power is not absolute. It is limited, inter alia, by statutes
designed to protect the family (e.g., the elective share), by doctrines designed to prevent
unfairness (e.g., unconscionability), and by considerations of public policy.
145. Fuller, supra note 8, at 799; Mason, supra note 2, at 832; von Mehren, Civil-Law
Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 HAgv. L. R~v. 1009,
1016-17 (1959).
146. See, e.g., E. CLAK, L. LusKy & A. MuiRuHm, supra note 62, at 1. For a suggestion
that courts may, in fact, be influenced by their perception of the wisdom of the testator's
wishes when they assess mental capacity, see Baron, Empathy, Subjectivity, and Testamentary
Capacity, 24 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1043 (1987).
147. Fuller, supra note 8, at 808-09.
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of donative transfers. In the eyes of some, consideration can, in addition
to its substantive role, function as a formality, rendering otherwise unim-
portant gift promises enforceable. Not all consideration theorists agree that
formality ought to substitute for substantive importance as a basis for
enforcing gift promises. Yet their debate with those who would enforce
formally made gift promises is to some extent moot. The courts have viewed
the doctrine of "nominal consideration," in which consideration is used as
a form, with some skepticism, and most agree that no alternative formality
has been developed in the area of gift promises.
This section examines traditional understandings of the consideration
doctrine in light of their implications for the gift/bargain dichotomy. Part
A explores why executory bargains are considered substantively more im-
portant than promises of gifts. The explanations of why informal bargains
are more deserving of legal intervention than informal gifts rely on a clear
vision of the necessity and primacy of the market as an allocator of social
utility in a commercial society. Part B explores why gift promises are
thought to merit enforcement on the basis of form alone. The relaxation
of requirements for the seal is thought to have rendered that device useless,
and in the absence of an accepted new formal mechanism there is some
doubt among commentators as to whether gift promises can be made with
the requisite formality. Part C analyses the interrelationship between con-
sideration's substantive and formal functions as well as its implications for
our understanding of what gifts are. The discussions of consideration suggest
that when we say gifts are not bargains we also say a good deal more; we
say, in effect, that they are rare, suspect, and trivial.
A. The Substantive Dimension of Consideration
In its substantive dimension, consideration enables courts to decide which
promises most deserve legal attention. "The law does not make contracts
out of all promises. . . . The legal enforcement of all promises is expensive.
No more expense should be incurred for the enforcement of promises than
the needs of our social order make imperative."' 141
The "costs" of (over)enforcing promises are two-fold. There are, first,
administrative costs, "the social effort expended in the legal procedure
148. Willis, Rationale of the Law of Contracts, 11 IND. L.J. 227, 230 (1935). See also
Hays, Formal Contracts and Consideration: A Legislative Program, 41 CoLum. L. REv. 849,
852 (1941) ("There is no sound a priori reason for assuming that all assurances intended to
be promises should be enforced .... When a court acts, it should be to advance some
interest of the social organization of which it is a part."); Patterson, An Apology for
Consideration, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 929, 942 (1958) (Not every promise, even though it may
arouse some expectation, should be legally enforceable.).
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necessary to enforcement."'' 49 The second cost is "less tangible and more
important."'' 50 "There is a real need for a field of human intercourse freed
from legal restraints, for a field where men may without liability withdraw
assurances they have once given."''
In light of these costs, judicial intervention should be reserved for promises
serving "some socially useful purpose.'' 2 The affirmative social purpose
of the consideration requirement derives from the role of the market in the
allocation of wealth in modern industrial society:
In a modern "free enterprise" society of the eighteenth to the twentieth
centuries, economic institutions supported and economic processes de-
pended upon the market . . . and the practice or habit of promise-
making became a pattern of our culture. Since this promise-making
occurred as a part of bargains, and as a means of controlling the future,
a legal rule that bargained-for promises are enforceable serves to support
and to reenforce the use of contract as an economic device, and thus
serves the needs of society151
Related to consideration's role in responding to the needs of the market
is its function of protecting expectations in a society accustomed to market
norms. In a commercial, credit economy, where wealth "is made up largely
of promises,' ' 5 4 reliance on promises "is a matter of tacit presupposition.' ' 55
In such a society, a "claim or want or demand . . . that promises be kept
.... ,a social interest in the stability of promises as a social and economic
institution, becomes of the first importance."'' 56 The consideration doctrine,
149. Fuller, supra note 8, at 813. See also Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 2 ("[C]ontract rules
must reflect considerations of administrability . . . as well as considerations of substance.").
To the extent that the social effort is expended merely in establishing that a promise was
made, that expenditure can be reduced if promises are made formally. The issue then becomes
whether some promises are sufficiently important to warrant the social effort that the absence
of form will necessitate. See infra text accompanying notes 152-77.
150. Fuller, supra note 8, at 813.
151. Id. (citation omitted). See also Willis, supra note 148, at 230 ("If social control was
applied to all promises there would be very little opportunity left for self-control. So far as it
is possible the making and performance of promises should, therefore, be left to personal
liberty.").
152. Hays, supra note 148, at 852.
153. Patterson, supra note 148, at 945 (citation omitted); see also Fuller, supra note 8, at
809 ("In modern society the most familiar field of regulation by private autonomy is that
having to do with the exchange of goods and services"); Hays, supra note 148, at 853 ("mhe
effective operation of the going community plainly requires enforcement [of business exchange
promises]."); Llewellyn, supra note 144, at 717 ("Bargain is then the social and legal machinery
appropriate to arranging affairs in any specialized economy which relies on exchange rather
than tradition (the manor) or authority (the army, the U.S.S.R.) for apportionment of
productive energy and of product.").
154. R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PmiosoPHY OF LAW 236 (1922).
155. Llewellyn, supra note 144, at 709. See also Sharp, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 41 CoLum.
L. REv. 783, 784 (1941) ("Business calculations assume inevitably the dependability of under-
takings about future conduct.").
156. R. POUND, supra note 154, at 237.
[Vol. 64:155
GIFTS, BARGAINS, AND FORM
properly applied, 5 7 ensures enforcement of those promises which are rea-
sonably understood to be binding and which are customarily relied on under
prevailing "business morals."' 58
Like the functional justification of the formalities of donative transfers,
the justification of consideration on the substantive ground that it affir-
matively promotes social utility rests on noteworthy assumptions. The notion
that the law should enforce those promises that contribute to market
processes assumes that the market is a necessary and valuable device for
the creation as well as the allocation of wealth. The notion that the law
should enforce those promises by which business people customarily expect
to be bound assumes a distinct market morality in which ordinary reliance
ought to be fostered. It is not just that reliance on business promises is
commonplace, but that it ought to be commonplace. As business life requires
trust, business promises ought to be kept. 5 9 Just as the functionalist
assumption that people are selfish in giving seems at odds with the altruistic,
familial context with which gifts are usually associated, the assumption that
business people trade on trust seems at odds with the self-interested, arm's
length context with which bargains are usually associated. Nonetheless, the
prevalence and importance of market bargains is seen to make enforcement
of those bargains essential.
If consideration serves one social purpose by affirmatively promoting
enforcement of those informal, business promises which reasonably produce
expectations in a market society, it serves an equally important social
purpose in the negative, by preventing enforcement of informal promises
whose social utility does not justify the costs of enforcement. Consideration
theorists recognized that "the characteristic effects of the doctrine of con-
sideration are to be seen only where consideration is lacking, never where
it is present."'16 In this light, the consideration requirement is seen as serving
the "deterrent" policy of rendering unenforceable "transaction types con-
sidered suspect or of marginal value," at least in the absence of formal
safeguards.' 6' The type of promise most frequently cited as being in this
157. Those who wrote about consideration were aware that the doctrine was (and is) not
always consistently or rationally applied. Indeed, like the functionalists, their effort was to
define the appropriate scope and application of the doctrine.
158. R. PouND, supra note 154, at 281.
159. See Pound, Promise or Bargain?, 33 Tut. L. REv. 455, 455-56 (1959):
In civilized society men must be able to assume that those with whom they deal
in the general intercourse of the society will act in good faith, and as a corollary
must be able to assume that those with whom they so deal will carry out their
undertakings according to the expectations which the moral sentiment of the
community attaches thereto.
160. Mason, supra note 2, at 831.
161. von Mehren, supra note 145, at 1017.
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category is the gratuitous promise, the promise to make a gift. 62
The reasons offered to explain why consideration should be used to bar
enforcement of promises to make gifts portray giving and bargaining as
almost totally distinct activities. While business promises are everyday
occurrences, "personal altruism is rare and from strangers even rarer,"'' 63
so promises prompted by affection' 64 "are seldom made."' 1 In contrast to
business bargains, where considerations of self-advantage put parties in a
"circumspective frame of mind,"'' 66 gift promises "are frequently made in
highly emotional states brought on by surges of gratitude, impulses of
display, or other intense but transient feelings."' 67
Just as donors tend to make gift promises casually and without deliber-
ation, 68 donees tend to take such promises less seriously than business
promises. 69 Whereas reliance on business bargains is a matter of tacit
presupposition, reliance on gift promises is foolhardy: "Things being what
they are (and apparently always have been), only a fool would rely on a
promise that voices a sudden affection."' 70
162. See, e.g., Ballentine, Mutuality of Consideration, 28 HARv. L. REv. 121, 121 (1914)
("The underlying principle of consideration would seem to be negative, a denial that ordinarily
there is sufficient reason why gratuitous promises should be enforced."); Fuller, supra note
8, at 815 ("[G]ratuities . . .do not present an especially pressing case for the application of
the principle of private autonomy . . ").
163. Stoljar, A Rationale of Gifts and Favours, 19 MOD. L. REv. 237, 249 (1956).
164. Charitable subscriptions are in a different category. They are often seen as being
motivated not by benevolence, but by pressure or a desire to increase one's status. See, e.g.,
Havighurst, Consideration, Ethics and Administration, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 17 (1942);
Stoljar, supra note 163, at 241.
165. Havighurst, supra note 164, at 15. See also Hays, supra note 148, at 860-61 (remarkably
few cases involving gift promises reach the courts).
As is pointed out infra note 176, commentators who spoke of the rarity of gift promises
also tended to speak of alternative devices (e.g., delivery or wills) for making gifts. It is thus
not clear that they were prepared to argue that gifts were, in absolute terms, uncommon. In
most instances, their arguments were cast in relative terms: Compared to executory bargains,
gift promises are rare; compared to business transfers, gift transfers are unlikely to require
legal attention. The claim that gifts are uncommon must, then, be understood to be made in
these comparative terms.
166. Fuller, supra note 8, at 816 n.27 (quoting Austin, Fragments-On Contracts, 2 LECTURES
IN JURISPRUDENCE 939, 940 (4th ed. 1873); see also Hamson, The Reform of Consideration,
54 LAw. Q. Rav. 233, 246 (1938) ("[Tihe fact of the bargain . .. is calculated to put the
parties on their guard."); cf. Llewellyn, supra note 144, at 743 ("[T]he existence of a bargain
equivalency does indeed commonly evidence positively that a promise was deliberate, ...
reduces the danger from possible perjury," and suggests that expectations are reasonable.)
167. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 5.
168. See, e.g., id.; Hamson, supra note 166, at 246; Patterson, supra note 148, at 949;
Sharp, supra note 155, at 788.
169. R. POUND, supra note 154, at 280-81; Hamson, supra note 166, at 246.
170. Stoljar, supra note 163, at 249 (citation omitted); see also A. SmrTH, AN INQUIRY INTO
THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. 1, ch. II at 19 (5th ed. 1811)
("Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly on the benevolence of his fellow citizens.");
Hamson, supra note 166, at 246 (Promisees know that gratuitous promises are not to be
construed in the same way as bargains); Patterson, supra note 148, at 943 (Gift promises are
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The assessment of gift promises also raises factual and administrative
problems not encountered with respect to bargains. "[T]he obligation created
by a donative promise may be excused by acts of the promisee amounting
to ingratitude, or by personal circumstances of the promisor that render
keeping the promise improvident."'171 Yet, "what constitutes ingratitude and
improvidence is very difficult to determine, particularly in the context of
the intimate relationships that often give rise to donative promises, and this
difficulty would add substantially to the problem of administration.
17 2
The most important respect in which gift promises are said to differ from
the executory bargains enforced under the consideration doctrine is that
they do not involve exchanges. In respect of consideration, "our 'archetype'
is the business trade of economic values in the form of goods, services, or
money. To the degree that a particular case deviates from this archetype,
the incentives to judicial intervention decrease .... ,'73 The business trade
is the archetype because "the great bulk of the more important promises
are made for the purpose of securing something in exchange."' 7 4 Gift
promises are less important because in that context "[the donee] seeks to
get something for nothing.'$ 175 While the market could not function to meet
society's needs without business promises, "it seems doubtful that there is
any substantial need for making gift-promises enforceable in view of the
facilities for making a present and final gift and the availability of testa-
vague and tend to be subject to a variety of unspecified excuses). Moreover, in the absence
of reliance, the donee's injuries are likely to be slight. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 3.
If the donee does rely, incurring costs or conferring benefits on the donor, that reliance or
unjust enrichment may be an independent substantive ground for enforcing the promise. Fuller,
supra note 8, at 810-13; Havighurst, supra note 164, at 16.
171. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 5 (emphasis in original). See also Havighurst, supra note
164, at 16 (Where gift promises are not performed, it is probably because "circumstances have
changed since the making of the promise, either with respect to the financial status of the
promisor or with respect to the needs of other natural objects of bounty.") (citation omitted).
172. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 6 (citation omitted). Essentially the same point has been
made in ethical terms. The moral obligation to fulfill promises is qualified by "vague and
unspecified excuses" such as "change of circumstances" or "unforeseen disadvantages."
Because the expectations reasonably created by promises are so varied, expectation provides
only an uncertain basis for deciding which promises to enforce. Patterson, supra note 148, at
943.
173. Fuller, supra note 8, at 818.
174. Havighurst, supra note 164, at 14. See also Ballentine, supra note 162, at 134 (The
law enforces "executory two-sided bargains" and not "one-sided or gratuitous promises"
because "[w]ithout some. . . legal guarantee that reciprocal bargains are binding, men would
be unable to do business . . ").
175. Ballentine, supra note 162, at 121. See also id. at 134 ("Where by the terms of the
bargain the plaintiff does not make any reciprocal undertaking and promises nothing definite
or certain in return . . . we have an entirely one-sided proposition."). Compare A. SmrrH,
supra note 170, at 19 ("Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do
this: Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want . . ").
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mentary disposition.' ' 76 Ultimately, business trades have an economic and
social utility that gifts simply lack: "While an exchange of goods is a
transaction which conduces to the production of wealth and the division of
labor, a gift is . . . a 'sterile transmission."'"' 77
B. Gift Promises and Form
However unimportant or unwise gift promises might be, donors may still
wish to make them.' 78 The question then arises whether, in light of gift
promises' lack of social utility, there are any circumstances under which
such promises should be given effect. 79 The answer to this question depends
on whether the formality of a gift promise can compensate for its substantive
unworthiness.
Some believe that only those promises "significant either to the economic
or the moral organization of society" warrant enforcement, and that "de-
liberation, seriousness of purpose, intent to be legally bound, even if they
[are] actually indicated by [a] formal device, are not, in themselves and
176. Patterson, supra note 148, at 955 (citation omitted). See also Havighurst, supra note
164, at 15 ("If the prospective donor's purpose is to distribute property with death in mind,
the will, the trust, or more rarely, the executed gift are the natural devices to employ.")
(citation omitted); Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
411, 417 (1977) (Gift promises "tend both to involve small stakes and to be made in family
settings where there are economically superior alternatives to legal enforcement.").
As many commentators have noted, gratuitous declarations of trust are enforceable without
formality notwithstanding their functional similarity to (unenforceable) promises to make a
gift. See, e.g., Fellows, supra note 140; Love, Imperfect Gifts as Declarations of Trust: An
Unapologetic Anomaly, 67 Ky. L.J. 309 (1978). Thus, such trusts offer an easy alternative to
the donor who desires, in effect, to make a gift promise. It has been pointed out, however,
that "[iun practical terms, . . . the law never suffers the inconsistency of revocable donative
promises and irrevocable self-declared trusts because irrevocable self-declared trusts in which
the donor reserves an income interest usually will not make good planning sense." Fellows,
supra note 140, at 34-35 (citation omitted).
177. Fuller, supra note 8, at 815 (quoting Busiom, PROPRIETE ET CONTRAT (2d ed. 1924)).
See also Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 4 (It is not clear that "independent social interests are
implicated" by gift promises; even if redistribution of wealth were an appropriate goal of
contract law, "the enforcement of donative promises would be a relatively trivial instrument
for achieving that end."); Sharp, supra note 155, at 788 (Gift promises "are of limited practical
importance.").
On the continental suspicion concerning gifts, see von Mehren, supra note 145, at 1017
n.34, and for a more elaborate treatment, J. DAwsoN, GinTs AND PROWSES: CONTINENTAL
AND AmERicAN LAW COMPARED (1980).
178. Posner, supra note 176, at 412-14.
179. As noted, supra note 170, unjust enrichment of the promisor or reliance by the promisee
are substantive factors which could justify enforcing promises that otherwise would lack the
desirability of exchanges. The remainder of the discussion here assumes neither of these factors
is present. For a discussion of detrimental reliance as a basis for enforcing gift promises, see
Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 18-31; Fellows, supra note 140, at 37-41.
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apart from other factors, proper grounds for enforcing promises."'' 0 Others,
focusing on the factual and administrative complexity of gift promises,
assert that even if formalities "address the problems of deliberative intent
and evidentiary security," they cannot alone "meet the problems of im-
providence and ingratitude."''
For many, however, the relative administrative complexity and economic
unimportance of gift promises weighs against enforcing only informal prom-
ises of gifts. A gift promise whose form denotes deliberation and provides
evidentiary reliability can, in this view, be enforced on the basis of its form
alone. Gift promises do not, in general, "present an especially pressing case
for the application of the principle of private autonomy."' 18 2 Yet, "the
greater that assurance" that the functions of form have been satisfied, "the
larger the scope we may be willing to ascribe to private autonomy."1 83 A
highly formal gift promise thus may qualify for enforcement.1
8 4
The question then of course becomes whether any formality providing
the necessary safeguards can be found. At one time, the seal could serve
as the requisite formality,'85 but its reduction to a printed "L.S." is widely
agreed to render it ineffective for this purpose. 8 6 The failure of reforms
such as the Uniform Written Obligations Act 87 suggests that the need for
a form to replace the seal still exists. 188
180. Hays, supra note 148, at 852-53. See also Patterson, supra note 148, at 941 ("The
notion that a promise should be either legally or ethically binding on the promisor merely
because it expresses his will to be bound, or his serious intention to assume a legal obligation,
seems entirely unfounded (although his will or his intention is a relevant fact).") (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted).
181. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 13.
182. Fuller, supra note 8, at 815. Compare id. at 809 ("[T]he most familiar field of
regulation by private autonomy is that having to do with the exchange of goods and services.").
183. Id. at 814.
184. See, e.g., Sharp, supra note 155, at 790 ("It should ... be possible to make promises
of gifts which will be enforceable"; gift promises should be enforced only if "solemnized by
some such form as the use of clear words of promise, or some other more elaborate modem
formal safeguard.").
185. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 148, at 934-35, 943, 949; von Mehren, supra note 145,
at 1052.
186. See, e.g., Hays, supra note 148, at 851; Patterson, supra note 148, at 949.
187. As originally drafted, Section 1 of the Act provided that "[a] written release or promise
hereafter made and signed by the person releasing or promising shall not be invalid or
unenforceable for lack of consideration, if the writing also contains an additional express
statement, in any form of language, that the signer intends to be legally bound." S. WrLLISTON,
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UinFoRM STATE LAWS 584
(1925). According to the author, Professor Samuel Williston, the Act's purpose was "to make
as a substitute for the very technical and easily substituted [seal], an expression which nobody
can misunderstand, which clearly indicates that it is intended to create a legal obligation." Id.
at 196 (comments of Professor Williston before the 35th Annual Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, 1925).
For criticisms of the Act, see Reeve, The Uniform Written Obligations Act, 76 U. PA. L.
REv. 580, 585 (1928); Stimson, The Uniform Written Obligations Act-A Written Instrument
as Presumptive Evidence of Consideration, 30 OR. L. REv. 78, 81 (1950).
188. Patterson, supra note 148, at 934, 957-60; von Mehren, supra note 145, at 1076; see
generally, Willis, supra note 148, at 233.
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Some of the early writers on consideration believed that, in addition to
its substantive role, consideration could play a formal role to help solve
this problem. The doctrine of "nominal" consideration, whereby a gift
promise is made binding through the payment of a trivial sum such as a
dollar or a cent, was seen as a formality serving ritual, evidentiary and
channeling functions. 8 9 Curiously, even this proposed use of consideration
as a form assumes the primacy of two-sided bargaining over one-sided
giving. It was "the fact that the parties have taken the trouble to cast their
transaction in the form of an exchange" that helped to satisfy the "desid-
erata underlying the use of formalities."' 90
The doctrine of nominal consideration has never fulfilled the promise
these writers saw in it. Not being a "natural formality,"' 9' it has never
been widely adopted by courts as a test of enforceability. 9 2 To the contrary,
and perhaps for good reasons, courts have instead been wary of the potential
of nominal consideration to serve as a screen for fraud and overreaching. 93
For these reasons, even those who believe that form constitutes an inde-
pendent basis for the enforcement of gift promises have been frustrated by
the lack of a readily available formality suited to promises of gifts. 94
C. Form, Substance, and Gifts
The conventional understanding of consideration helps create a dichotomy
between gifts and bargains by treating them as transfers that are different
both in kind and in importance. It teaches that because gift transfers are
socially uncommon and economically insignificant, they warrant less legal
attention than bargains. The frequency and economic necessity of bargains
is thought to justify routine legal intervention to determine whether a
189. Fuller, supra note 8, at 820; see also Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and
Consideration, 18 CA n. L. REv. 611, 613 (1930):
Probably the doctrine of consideration has some utility. Just as oral gifts are
invalid without delivery, so promises not under seal are invalid unless there is
an exchange given for them. The aims in both cases are to make more certain
that the transaction was seriously intended and to make more difficult the
fabrication of a gift or a contract.
Cf. Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STA. L. Ray. 1107, 1115 (1984)
(The doctrine of nominal consideration satisfied the needs of the classical school of contract
law for "standardization and rigorous objectivity.").
190. Fuller, supra note 8, at 820. See also von Mehren, supra note 145, at 1053 ("The
essence of nominal consideration is the introduction of a contrived element of exchange into
the transaction.").
191. Fuller, supra note 8, at 815.
192. Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 1113 n.15; von Mehren, supra note 145, at 1053-55.
193. von Mehren, supra note 145, at 1054-55. See also Llewellyn, supra note 144, at 744("[W]hen the courts . . . recognize in general language the adequacy of thoroughly formal
consideration, they obscure the problem . . . of discrepancy in bargaining power and semi-
duress in fact.").
194. See, e.g., Sharp, supra note 155, at 790.
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contract has been made; exchange is said to be a ground for enforcement
even in the absence of formality. Yet in the case of gifts, where there is
said to be no exchange, legal intervention is not considered warranted except
on formal grounds. It is for this reason that, in the absence of a formality
which can perform for gift promises the functions of the delivery and wills
acts requirements, gift promises fail altogether. In the end, the enforceable
executory bargain has no counterpart in the law of gifts. If a gift is not
executed by delivery it is of no legal effect at all.
The doctrinal distinction between (enforceable) executed gifts and (unen-
forceable) informal promises to make gifts makes sense only if merely
promising and actually delivering reflect real differences in donative inten-
tion. It is not clear, however, that the intent underlying a donative promise
is always or necessarily distinct in fact from that underlying an executed
gift: "Property owners make donative promises that they do not execute
prior to death that, nevertheless, reflect their final donative intent."1 95 Rather
than developing criteria to ascertain which donative promises reflect final
donative intent, the consideration theorists sought reasons to deny enforce-
ability to all gift promises. Ultimately, they argued that, due to gifts'
substantive unimportance, the enforcement of informal gift promises was
not worth the cost.196
It could, of course, be argued that as long as a gift can be made, the
distinction between bargains (enforceable even if executory and informal)
and gifts (enforceable only if formally executed) is not terribly meaningful.
Yet the significance of the differential treatment of gifts and bargains
emerges clearly if it is viewed in connection with the functionalist account
of the channelling function. In that account, channelling is valued for its
efficiency. Where, as the functionalists assumed, courts can ascertain indi-
viduals' intentions only with great difficulty, the standardization produced
by form reduces confusion and its resulting administrative costs. Following
this view, enforcement of only those gifts which are formally executed keeps
legal involvement to a minimum. The question of the existence of a gift
and of its terms can alike be resolved by a simple search for external signs.
When the accounts of the functions of consideration and of form are
combined, they send a single message. Gifts are marginal. Socially uncom-
mon, economically unimportant, morally unworthy, gifts can claim little on
their own behalf. The weakness of their claim justifies the law in treating
them with only the greatest reluctance and suspicion.
195. Fellows, supra note 140, at 36.
196. For recent arguments to the same effect, see Eisenberg, supra note 2; Goetz & Scott,
Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980). For
a critique of these arguments and a proposal to make gift promises enforceable in some
circumstances, see Fellows, supra note 140.
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III. WHAT IS A GIFT?
Discussions of consideration and of the functions of form both envision
gifts and bargains as distinct kinds of transfers, differing in practical and
therefore in legal importance. Yet in the 19th century at least, commentators
tended to emphasize the similarities, not the differences, between these two
apparently disparate categories of transfers. They pointed out, for example,
that "[t]he idea of gift embraces both giver and taker . . . " and thus
"gifts are in the nature of, or at least originate in, a mutual undertaking." ''
Not only did both categories of transfer involve relations between two or
more parties, but agreement between those parties was seen as critical in
both cases: "[I]t requires the assent of both minds to make a gift as it does
to make a contract.' ' 98 On the basis of these observations, Kent and others
argued that gifts were contracts. 199 The consideration requirement rendered
such contracts unenforceable while executory,200 but they were contracts
nonetheless.
To those trained to think of contracts as those obligations the law will
enforce, there is not much to be said for Kent's view that a gift not yet
delivered was a form of contract. Nor was the view of gifts as a species of
often-unenforceable contract inconsistent with later understandings of con-
sideration's substantive purpose. In terms of social utility, it makes little
difference whether gift promises are denied enforcement on the ground that
they are ineffective executory contracts or on the ground that they are not
contracts at all.
Yet the 19th century notion of gift as a form of contract is worth bearing
in mind because it contrasts sharply with the competing view that gifts and
contracts are absolutely different things. In 1884, one commentator was
confident that "[t]he best authorities of the present day . . . treat the
element of consideration as a nonessential for classifying [gifts and con-
tracts], though practically an essential when it comes to the matter of legal
enforcement." 201 By 1914, things had changed. A new treatise explained
197. 2 J. SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 57, at 60 (2d ed.
1884).
198. Hill v. Wilson, 8 L.R. 888, 896 (Ch. App. 1873); see also 2 J. KENT, CommENTAmS
*438 (A gift requires "the mutual consent and concurrent will of both parties."). Assent is
required because a gift cannot be effective without acceptance by the donee. See, e.g., Hill, 8
L.R. at 896; R. BROWN, supra note 15, at 127-28; W. THORNTON, supra note 63, at 68.
199. 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *438 ("[E]very gift which is made perfect by delivery, and
every grant, are executed contracts; for they are founded on the mutual consent of the parties,
in reference to a right or interest passing between them."); 2 J. ScHOT LER, supra note 197, §
57, at 60-61 ("A gift, then, is a contract, or originates in a contract . . . and at all events
imports an agreement, because it is founded in the convention of two or more parties ....").
200. 2 J. SCHOULER, supra note 197, § 57, at 61. See also Gray v. Barton, 55 N.Y. 68, 72
(1873) ("To make . . . [a gift] valid, the transfer must be executed, for the reason that, there
being no consideration therefor, [sic] no action will lie to enforce it.").
201. 2 J. SCHOULER, supra note 197, § 57, at 60 (citation omitted).
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that "[o]ne of the most essential elements of a gift is the absence of
consideration. If a consideration appears, the transaction is not a gift...
The latter view prevailed; a leading modern treatise states: "A gift is
distinguished from other voluntary transfers primarily by its gratuitous
character. If there be valid legal consideration for the transfer, then the
transaction is of the nature of a contract or a sale and is governed by the
particular rules applicable thereto.'"'
Those who pointed out the substantive function of consideration implicitly
explained why gifts and contracts should be treated as fundamentally
separate categories. Contracts are exchanges; gifts are not.2 4 In a donative
transfer, the donee "seeks to get something for nothing"; 2° he or she
"alone stands to gain";201 and the donor, rather than thinking of him or
herself, "tends to look mainly to the interests of" the donee.2°7
This vision of giving as involving one-sided donation in opposition to
two-sided exchange contrasts sharply with the earlier notion of giving as
involving mutual undertakings and mutual assent. This section explores
whether it might be misleading to think of giving as being one-sided. Part
A examines civil and early common law definitions of gifts, none of which
sharply differentiate gifts from exchanges. Part B reviews nonlegal views of
giving; these views tend to emphasize the rewards to donors, rather than
the benefits to donees, in explaining gifts. Part C suggests that the vision
of gifts as one-sided transfers may, like the functional justification of form,
be a "structure of consciousness."
A. Civil Law and Early Common Law Definitions of Gifts
The definition of a gift as a transfer without consideration can only be
adopted in a legal system employing the consideration doctrine. The Western
European civil law systems, which do not have a consideration require-
ment,2°s define gifts quite differently. The French Civil Code, for example,
202. F. CHLDS, PRINCIPLES OF T LAW OF PERsONAL PROPERTY 293 (1914). See also Jackson
v. Twenty-third St. Ry. Co., 47 N.Y. Super. 85, 88 (1881), rev'd, 88 N.Y. 526 (1882) ("A
gift, as implied by its definition, must be without consideration."); W. THORNTON, supra note
63, at 3 ("In fact, if there be a consideration the transaction is no longer a gift, but a
contract.").
203. R. BROWN, supra note 15, § 7.1, at 76-77 (citation omitted).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 173-77. Many of those who contrasted business
exchanges and gifts recognized that some reciprocities were involved in gift transfers, but
distinguished those reciprocities from "exchange[s] of values." See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 8,
at 809; Patterson, supra note 148, at 946.
205. Ballentine, supra note 162, at 121. See also id. at 132 (contrasting executory two-sided
bargains to one-sided or gratuitous promises).
206. Hamson, supra note 166, at 255.
207. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 5.
208. See, e.g., J. DAwsoN, supra note 177; Mason, supra note 2; von Mehren, supra note
145.
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defines a gift as "an instrument through which the donor divests himself
now and irrevocably of the thing given, in favor of the donee who accepts
it."209 An early civil law treatise described an inter vivos gift as "a contract
made by a reciprocal consent" between the donor and the donee, 210 and the
current French Civil Code imposes numerous requirements that under the
common law are associated with contracts: "An inter vivos gift does not
bind the donor and produces no effect until the day when it is accepted in
express terms .... ,", and "[a] gift duly accepted is perfected by the sole
consent of the parties .... ",212 A leading contemporary commentator has
summarized the matter as follows: "In what might be called the Romanesque
tradition, a gift is conceived as a two-sided transaction, a contract which,
like any other contract, requires mutual assent and is discussed, if trouble
comes, with the vocabulary of the law of contract.1 21 3
The difference between the civil and common law conceptions of gifts
cannot fairly be attributed to obvious cultural disparities between Western
European and Anglo-American societies. Rather, the difference derives from
the fact that the two systems have quite divergent concerns in respect of
donative transfers. The common law, as we have seen, considers judicial
intervention to be warranted only in the case of bargains, not executory
gifts; the common law is thus concerned to separate gifts from exchanges.
The civil law's concerns with respect to gifts are quite different; they pertain
to the effects of gifts on the scheme of forced heirship which guarantees
close relatives a share of a decedent's estate. 2 4 In such a system, the focus
is not on the difference between gifts and bargains, but on the difference
between gifts that threaten to deplete the estate and gifts that do not.21 5
Unlike the common law system, in which "most promises of gifts are wasted
words, and it is only their performance that counts,1 216 the civil law denies
enforcement of only those gift promises which threaten forced heirship, and
it routinely invalidates completed gifts which reduce an heir's inheritance.
217
209. C. Civ. art. 894 (Fr.); see also C. Civ. art. 895 ("A testament is an instrument through
which the testator disposes, for the time when he will no longer exist, of all or part of his
property, and which he may revoke."). Illustrations of the modem civil law view of gifts will
be taken from the French Civil Code. The particular translation of the code used in the
preparation of this article is THE FRENcH Cwv. CODE (J. Crabb trans. 1977). The particular
aims of this section do not include a comprehensive study of all modem civil law jurisdictions,
though it is anticipated that examples from other jurisdictions whose law is modeled upon the
Roman civil law would result in definitions of a gift closely analogous to the modern definition
in France.
210. J. DoMAT, Tna Crvi LAW iN ITS NATuRAL ORDER § 918 (W. Strahan trans. 1850).
211. C. Civ. art. 932.
212. C. Crv. art. 938.
213. J. DAWSON, supra note 177, at 2.
214. Id. at 224-25. On the system of forced heirship in the civil law, see id. (passim).
215. J. DAWSON, supra note 177, at 65-67, 116-17, 224-25.
216. Id. at 2.
217. Id. at 65-67, 116-17, 224-25; Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 14-15.
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This simple contrast between the civil and common law treatment of
gifts2 8 suggests that a legal system's definition of gifts will reflect that
system's substantive preoccupations, not some immutable "nature" that
gifts have. This point is reinforced by a view to how gifts were treated by
common law writers prior to the development of the consideration doc-
trine.2 1 9 Drawing no clear lines between gifts and exchanges, Glanville wrote
of an owner's freedom to "give" a part of a freehold estate "to any person
. . . in remuneration of his services . . .";2o what was critical to the
enforceability of the gift was not bargain or exchange, but the transfer of
seisin.22 Treatises in the following centuries emphasized "the full intention
that the thing . . .not return to the donor and . . . [the] full intention
on the part of the receiver to reclaim the thing entirely as his own. . .";222
the focus was on the need for a transfer causing property "to belong
effectively to the recipient" so that the gift could not be revoked. 224 It is
not until late in the 18th century22 that Blackstone and others began to
218. No attempt is made here to detail all the ways in which the civil law regulation of
gifts differs from common law regulation. For an analysis of the civil law regulation of gifts,
see J. DAwsoN, supra note 177. Among the ways in which the civil law system differs most
notably from the common law system are the former's requirement of notorial registration
for gifts and the revocability of gifts for ingratitude.
219. See 0. HOLMEs, Tim COMMON LAW 289-97 (1923); E. JENKS, Tm HISTORY OF THE
DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION IN ENGISH LAW (1892); T. PLucKNETT, A CONcISE HISTORY OF
THE ComoMMO LAW (5th ed. 1956); Barton, The Early History of Consideration, 85 LAW. Q.
REv. 372 (1969); Henry, Consideration in Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 621 (1917); Holmes, Early
English Equity, I LAw. Q. REv. 162 (1885); Salmond, The History of Contract, 3 LAW. Q.
REv. 166 (1887).
220. R. GLANvIa=, A TREATISE ON THi LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE KINGDOM OF ENGLAND
114 (J. Beames trans. 1900).
221. Id. ("[I]f. .. a Donation should not be followed up by seisin, nothing can, after the
death of the Donor, be claimed. . . in virtue of it. . .; because such a disposition is usually
interpreted ... rather as a naked promise, than a real promise or donation.").
222. 1 BRrrrON 220 (F. Nichols trans. 1865).
223. 3 FLETA 5 (Selden Society Vol. 89 1972).
224. Id. See also 1 BRrrroN, supra note 222, at 220.
225. As late as 1743, "gift" was defined as "a conveyance which by either lands or goods
are passed; and it is a larger extent than a grant, it being applied to things movable and
immovable." JACOB'S NEw LAW DICTIONARY (London 1743). Two components critical to
Blackstone's definition of a gift are conspicuously lacking from Jacob's definition. First,
although Jacob notes that a gift "may be good without consideration," id., he does not
require that a gift be without consideration. Contra 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *440.
Second, Blackstone's proposed distinction between gifts and grants-that the former are without
consideration and the latter are founded upon consideration-appears nowhere in Jacob's
definitions of either a "gift" or a "grant." Compare 2 W. BLACKSTONE *440 with JACOB'S
NEW LAW DICTIONARY (London 1743).
This evidence, in addition to the fact that definitions of gifts and grants closely resembling
Blackstone's appear in later editions of Jacob's dictionary antedating the publication of
Blackstone's Commentaries, suggests that it was not until Blackstone that the distinctions
between gifts and contracts, and between gifts and grants, were defined in terms of a presence
or absence of consideration. See, e.g., JACOB'S NEw LAW DICTIONARY (Philadelphia & New
York 1811).
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define gifts as gratuitous and to contrast them to contracts or other transfers
made upon consideration. 22 6 By that time, of course, the consideration
doctrine had undergone significant development. 227
Just as the modern civil law definition of a gift reflects that system's
preoccupation with heirs' forced shares, the early common law definitions
reflect a feudal preoccupation with seisin and the finality of transfers. The
divergence among the various definitions suggests that the legal context in
which any definition of a gift is formulated affects the terms in which a
gift is defined. At any rate, there is nothing inevitable about the now-
accepted definition of a gift as a transfer without consideration; the civil
law has never defined a gift in that way, and the common law did without
such a definition for centuries.
B. Some Contrasting Views of Giving
The subject of giving has fascinated many in such nonlegal disciplines as
anthropology, sociology, and psychology.? Within these fields, there is no
lack of controversy concerning the prevalence, sources, and patterns of
what is sometimes called "altruistic" behavior. To a lawyer, however, what
is striking about these varied accounts is the extent to which, despite internal
disagreements, they collectively reflect a vision of giving quite different
from the legal view of gifts as transfers distinguishable from bargains. For
non-lawyers, gifts are exchanges. They are not necessarily exchanges of
goods, and they are distinct in important ways from the conventional
exchanges of the market, but they are exchanges nonetheless.
In a seminal essay written in 1925, the French sociologist/anthropologist
Marcel Mauss suggested that in the "primitive" or "archaic" societies that
anthropologists had theretofore studied, patterns of giving which seemed
voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous were in fact obligatory and inter-
ested. 229 In such societies, where groups exchange not only goods but also
"courtesies, entertainments, ritual, military assistance, women, children,
dances, and feasts, '2 0 gift-exchanges constitute "total social phenomena,
[in which] all kinds of institutions find simultaneous expression: religious,
226. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *440; 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *354.
227. See supra note 219.
228. I do not pretend to be an expert in any of these fields. The following account is based
on resources studied in the course of a reasonably thorough search of materials available in
my university's main research library. My goal is not to provide a detailed account of
anthropological, sociological, or psychological theories, or of the differences between them.
Rather, it is to point up the ways in which all of these theories diverge from the legal
understanding of gifts.
229. M. MAuss, Tim GIFr: FoaMs AND FuNCTioNs OF EXCHANGE IN ARcHAIc SociTs 1
(I. Cunnison trans. 1954).
230. Id. at 3.
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legal, moral, and economic." 21 This system of "total prestation" involves
three interdependent obligations-to give, to receive, and to repay.232 Com-
pliance with these obligations establishes the relative power and status of
groups and clans.23
The idea of giving as interested and obligatory has been enormously
influential. In sociology, for example, it has been used to support the theory
that social interaction is an economy of non-material as well as material
goods, in which "[p]ersons that give much to others try to get much from
them, and persons that get much from others are under pressure to give
much to them. ' '234 While there is some disagreement as to whether or not
the exchange process results from an internalized "norm of reciprocity,"
2 5
there is widespread agreement that an unreciprocated gift creates an imbal-
ance of social power between the donor and the donee. 23 6 To prevent or
rectify such imbalances, gifts are reciprocated.
23 7
To see gifts as exchanges-and not as the one-sided transactions depicted
in legal discussions-is not necessarily to see gifts as "bargains." Beyond
the fact that gift-exchange may involve non-material goods as opposed to
commodities, social scientists see significant distinctions between purely
economic transactions and gift exchanges.
First, whereas economic transactions are exchanges of equivalents, the
reciprocal gift is never the precise equivalent of what was initially given.238
231. Id. at 1.
232. Id. at 10-11.
233. Id. at 4.
234. Homans, Social Behavior as Exchange, 63 AM. J. Soc. 597, 606 (1958). See also P.
BLAu, ExcLANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIn 89 (1964) ("An individual who supplies rewarding
services to another obligates him. To discharge this obligation, the second must furnish benefits
to the first in turn.").
235. Compare, e.g., Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 AM.
Soc. REv. 161 (1960) with P. BLAu, supra note 234, at 92.
236. See, e.g., P. BIAu, supra note 234, at 108 (A gift to one who cannot reciprocate is a
source of superordination over others.); Schwartz, The Social Psychology of the Gift, 73 AM.
J. Soc. 1, 4 (1967) (Individuals maintain ascendency by regulating the indebtedness of others
to them.). See also W. DILLON, Grs AND NATIONS: THE OBLIGATION TO GivE, RECEIVE AND
REPAY 73 (1968) (suggesting that in international technical assistance programs between nations,
"the donor nation incurs the hostility of people in the receiver nation to the extent that the
donor frustrates the discharge of their felt obligation") (citation omitted); R. EMERSON, Gifts,
in THE ESSAYS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 309, 311 (Mod. Libr. ed. 1944) ("It is not the
office of a man to receive gifts. How dare you give them? We wish to be self-sustained. We
do not quite forgive a giver."); Amundsent & Ferngren, Philanthropy in Medicine: Some
Historical Perspectives, in BENEFICENCE AND HEALTH CARE 1, 5 (E. Shelp ed. 1982) (suggesting
that in the classical world philanthropy gave rise to an obligation on the part of the poor to
reciprocate through public recognition of the donor's benefaction; the desire to receive enhanced
status was a chief motivation for philanthropy).
237. See, e.g., P. BLAu, supra note 234, at 16; Gouldner, supra note 235, at 171; Homans,
supra note 234, at 606.
238. See, e.g., L. HYDE, THE GIFr: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY 9
(1979) ("A market exchange has an equilibrium or stasis: you pay to balance the scale."); P.
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The equivalent return required in an economic transaction is explicitly
bargained for, is stipulated in advance, and is externally enforced, usually
by the law.239 While a non-economic exchange involves "a general expec-
tation of some future return, its exact nature is definitely not stipulated in
advance.'"'m Moreover, "the nature of the return cannot be bargained about
but must be left to the discretion of the one who makes it."'2A Reciprocation
can never be assured or enforced, but instead is a matter of trust or
gratitude. 242
Second, the absence of commodity exchange in non-market transfers has
important implications for the interpersonal effects of gift exchange. Where
the objectively equal is given for the objectively equal, "man himself is
really irrelevant"; personal interaction recedes into the background, while
goods gain a life of their own.243 A gift, in contrast, "establishes a feeling-
bond between two people. "2" By engendering feelings of personal obligation,
gratitude, and trust, gifts can act as a bridge or connection between
individuals?25 The personal, connected quality of giving may require the
donor to employ modes of thinking quite different from those appropriate
to the market. Some believe that economic transfers call for detached,
analytic deliberation in quantitative, cost-benefit terms which are inappro-
priate to the emotional and moral realm of gifts.246
BLAu, supra note 234, at 93 ("The basic and most crucial distinction [between social and
strictly economic exchange] is that social exchange entails unspecified obligations."); Gouldner,
supra note 235, at 172 (The return required under the norm of reciprocity is not the objective
equivalent of the thing given.).
Thus, a return of the exact equivalent breaks the rule of approximate reciprocity and, by
changing the relationship to an economic one, expresses unfriendliness. Schwartz, supra note
236, at 5-6.
239. P. BLAu, supra note 234, at 93 (The prototypical economic exchange rests on a formal
contract stipulating the exact quantities to be exchanged.); Simmel, Faithfulness and Gratitude,
in Tim SOCIOLOGY OF GEORO SIM1EL 379, 387 (K. Wolff ed. 1950) ("In all economic exchanges
... the legal constitution enforces and guarantees the reciprocity of service and return
service .. ").
240. P. BLAu, supra note 234, at 93.
241. Id.
242. See id. at 94 ("Since there is no way to assure an appropriate -return for a favor,
social exchange requires trusting others to discharge their obligations."); Simmel, supra note
239, at 387 (In relations to which the legal form does not apply, "enforcement of the
equivalence is out of the question. Here gratitude appears as a supplement. It establishes the
bond of interaction, of the reciprocity of service and return service, even where they are not
guaranteed by external coercion.").
243. Simmel, supra note 239, at 388. See also P. B.Au, supra note 234, at 112 ("The taboo
on explicit bargaining in the exchange of gifts is designed to protect their significance as tokens
of friendship ...from being obliterated by the inherent value of the objects themselves.").
244. L. HYDE, supra note 238, at 56.
245. See, e.g., id.; P. BLAu, supra note 234, at 94; Simmel, supra note 239, at 388.
246. L. HYDE, supra note 238, at 62-66. See also P. BLAu, supra note 234, at 112 ("Social
exchange. . . is an intermediate case between pure calculation of advantage and pure expression
of love."); G. PALMER, ALTRuism: ITS NATURE AND VARIaETs 60 (1920) ("Gifts come from a
region outside claims, outside rational justification. ... Were there legitimate grounds for
my pretended gift it would be merely the payment of a debt and would afford no such pleasure
as the over-and-above of a gift ....99).
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The significance of these differences between economic transactions and
gift exchanges is the subject of some dispute. To the extent that gifts can
be used to enhance status and power, gift-exchange can be characterized as
a non-commodity market which functions in the affective realm in much
the same way as commodity markets function in the conventional economic
realm. Both markets are driven by egoism, and while the participants in
the gift-exchange process may deal with one another on an emotional and
not arm's length basis, there is nothing transformative about their emotional
dealings. They are no less fundamentally hostile to one another after their
exchanges than they were before. 247
However, many argue that gift-exchange dissolves hostility and creates
community bonds. The gift-exchange process may begin with an egoistic
expectation of return advantage, but it utilizes or channels that self-interest
in a way that ultimately enhances the social and emotional connections
between individuals.2 8 The donor may give only in hope of return, and the
donee may reciprocate only in the interest of continuing to receive the
donor's benefaction, yet each must trust the other to fulfill his or her
unspoken obligation. Thus a process of exchange that begins in pure self-
interest may generate trust in social relations.29
247. See M. SAaHNs, STom AGE EcoNoMIcs 170 (1972) ("Reciprocity is a 'between' relation.
It does not dissolve the separate parties within a higher unity, but on the contrary, in
correlating their opposition, perpetuates it."); see also G. PALMER, supra note 246, at 61 ("A
gift has always something disparaging about it .... The giver is the ... man of power ....
the receiver confessedly the man of need, passive to another's will. The very attempt, then,
that I make to raise him up . . . sets him beneath me. He lacks, I abound."); Schwartz,
supra note 236, at 4-5 (In exchanging gifts, individuals maintain ascendency by regulating the
indebtedness of others to them.).
Those who view gift-exchange as a form of non-commodity market describe human behavior
in somewhat the same way as did the functionalists; in both instances, for example, it is
assumed that human beings "are" selfish and self-interested. It is questionable whether the
sociologists' assumptions about the way humans and the market "are" are any more accurate
than the functionalists' assumptions. Market systems need not necessarily rely on or call forth
only selfishness. See, e.g., Coase, Adam Smith's View of Man, 19 J.L. & ECON. 529 (1976);
G. PALIMR, supra note 246, at 77-87. The social scientists' statements about human behavior
in markets thus may themselves be caricatures or stereotypes.
However, to the extent that the vision of gift-exchange as a non-commodity market assumes
that people "are" selfish, then there is a curious incongruity between the legal requirements
applicable to gift-exchanges on the one hand and conventional market bargains on the other.
The selfishness that is said to make formality necessary in the gift context is said to render
formality unnecessary in the bargain context. See infra text accompanying notes 251-54.
248. See, e.g., P. BLAu, supra note 234, at 92 ("Exchange processes utilize . . . the self
interests of individuals to produce a differentiated social structure within which norms tend
to develop that require individuals to set aside some of their personal interests for the sake
of those of the collectivity."); Gouldner, supra note 235, at 173 (Reciprocity's processes
"mobilize egoistic motivations and channel them into the maintenance of the social system.");
Simmel, supra note 239, at 389 (Gratitude is a "powerful means of social cohesion.").
249. P. BLAu, supra note 234, at 94. See also Levi-Strauss, The Principle of Reciprocity,
in SocIoLoGicAL THEORY: A BooK OF READINGS 63, 66 (L. Coser & B. Rosenberg 4th ed.
1976) (The custom of pouring wine in one's neighbor's glass at provincial French restaurants
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Though there may be no consensus on whether the process of giving
merely prevents social fragmentation or affirmatively promotes community,
the adherents of each view agree that giving is exchange. Whether or not
donors are motivated by the expectation of reward, they are rewarded.250
The one-sided transfer of benefits that defines a gift in the law's eyes is
not what social scientists have discovered in their studies of gifts.
C. Some Implications of the View that Gifts are Exchanges
If gifts are exchanges rather than one-sided transfers, should the law treat
them differently than it currently does? This question can be approached
in two ways. First, we might ask whether, if this alternative view of giving
is accepted, formalities and the functional explanation which has been
offered for them would seem as necessary as they now do. Second, we
might ask whether, if gifts are exchanges, there is any persuasive reason to
treat gifts differently than we do conventional economic bargains.
Assuming gift-exchange merely replicates in social or affective terms the
self-interested struggle of the commodities markets, 25 the need for formal-
ities becomes questionable. If the donor, like the contract promisor, acts
out of self-interest and in expectation of future gain, his or her gift is a
calculated act; if a gift is by hypothesis the product of deliberation, the
donor needs a separate ritual to underscore the significance of his or her
act no more than a market participant does. Nor is evidentiary reliability
necessarily of greater concern in gift-exchange than in market-exchange.
The selfish urge toward perjury is prevalent in respect to contracts as well
as gifts, yet the Statute of Frauds provisions applicable to the former impose
requirements considerably less onerous than those applicable to the latter. 252
is "an affirmation of good grace which dispels ... reciprocal uncertainty ... [and] substitutes
a social bond for mere physical juxtaposition"; acceptance of the offered wine authorizes an
offer of conversation. "Thus a number of minute social bonds are established by a series of
alternating oscillations, in which a right is established in the offering and an obligation in the
receiving.").
250. Psychologists disagree on why people give, some arguing for the primacy of situational
factors and others offering normative or cultural explanations. For a variety of views, see the
essays in ALTRUISM AND HELING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTE-
CEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES (J. MaCaulay & L. Berkowitz eds. 1970); ALTRuisM AND HELPING
BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL, PERSONALITY, AND DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES (J. Rushton & R. Sor-
rentino eds. 1981); ALTRuIsM, SYMPATHY, AND HELPING: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
PRICnPLES (L. Wisp6 ed. 1978). Whether or not they see the psychological rewards to the
giver as the primary motivating factor in gift-giving, all agree that there are such rewards.
251. See supra text accompanying note 247.
252. Contracts within the Statute of Frauds need only be in writing and signed by the party
to be charged, whereas nonholographic wills must be witnessed and, in some states, signed at
the end.
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If a simple signed writing meets the problem in the one case, why is more
needed in the other?m3
As we have seen, not everyone shares the view that gift-exchange is truly
analogous to market exchange. 214 Yet even for those who view gift-exchange
as a process by which egoistical, self-interested motivations are channelled
in ways that ultimately connect individuals more closely to one another, the
utility of formalities is questionable. To the extent that formalities foster
deliberation, calculation, precision and quantification, they are at odds with
the spirit of giving. Gifts are socially important precisely because they are
spontaneous, approximate and unspecifiable. Why should the law impose
requirements which are inconsistent with these attributes and which seek to
make gifts like bargains?
The question whether the law ought to retain the formalities currently
applicable to gifts is related to another, more important question: Is there
a reason to treat conventional market bargains as more worthy of legal
intervention than gifts? In the consideration context, as we have seen, 5 the
affirmative justification for enforcing bargains is to protect the social interest
in securing the commonly-held expectations customarily engendered by
business promises. If, as social scientists claim, there are equally strong and
established expectations with respect to giving, it is not immediately obvious
why these expectations should not be protected as well.
One answer, of course, is that the economic expectations produced by
market bargains are easily distinguishable from the imprecise, non-quanti-
fiable expectations involved in gift-exchange. Yet it is not entirely clear why
the expectations of gift-exchange should be any less important for being
non-economic. Wealth consists of more than commodities.256 Objects can
be valuable not just as means of producing additional material rewards but
because "they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing
personal entities in the world." 7 The giving of objects can be part of this
process of self-definition. 8 Are these social and personal attributes of gift-
253. There are many who argue, with respect to contracts, that the protections provided by
the Statute of Frauds are not worth the problems the statute causes. See, e.g., Wyndham v.
Chetwynd, 96 Eng. Rep. 53, 55 (K.B. 1757). Whether or not the requirements of the Statute
of Frauds are warranted in the case of contracts, some writings should be required in the case
of wills because the testator's death otherwise will render perjury impossible to combat.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 243-44.
255. See supra Part II.
256. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MicH.
L. REV. 722 (1988); W. BLum & H. KALVEN, THE UNEAsY CASE FOR PROcGRESSIVE TAXATION
(1953).
257. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STr. L. REv. 957, 959 (1982) (arguing that
property more closely connected with personhood exerts a stronger claim of entitlement than
fungible property).
258. See T. SHAmER, DEATH, PROPERTY, AND LAwYERs: A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH 77-78
(1970) ("Property is part of personality, and personality is involved with property in the life
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exchange necessarily of less dignity than the economic attributes of market
bargains? Only if wealth is defined solely in terms of commodities is it fair
to characterize a gift as a "sterile transmission. ' 259
Yet even conceding the importance of the non-economic values of gift-
exchange, there might nonetheless be reasons for the law to minimize its
involvement in donative transfers. If in fact the obligations of gift-exchange
are satisfied through the non-legal pressures exerted by trust, gratitude and
the like, legal intervention may be both unnecessary and inappropriate. In
any event, the law may be unsuited to engaging in the complicated emotional
and social calculus of the gift-exchange process.
None of these arguments seems compelling. The business-related, non-
legal pressures that cause most market participants to fulfill their bargains
voluntarily are not thought to eliminate the need for judicial involvement
in contracts;26 why should the social or psychological pressures that underlie
gift-exchange require a different approach for donative transfers? Moreover,
the notion that the law should avoid entanglement with gifts because its
enforcement mechanisms-awards of damages and the like-are ill-suited
to the connected, socially cohesive qualities of gifts suggests that the law
should not involve itself with gifts at all; that suggestion conflicts with our
legal system's ostensible commitment to lend its power to private decisions
in the field of donative transfers. Finally, our legal system is not always
adverse to tackling questions of enormous social and emotional complexity.
In areas such as family law and reproductive rights it takes on such questions
routinely. 261
In the end, the persistence of formal requirements for donative transfers
and the reluctance to enforce such transfers except on purely formal grounds
carries a message. Gifts are uncommon, untrustworthy, and unimportant.
The formalities and the differential treatment of gifts and bargains have
been justified as responses to "real" phenomena: the "needs" of individuals,
of the economy, and of the judicial system. There is, however, reason to
of a wills client. His seeing death in relation to property and the survival of property-
personality robs death of some of its stark power."); Schwartz, supra note 236, at 2 ("The
act of giving is self-defining .... Men tend to confirm their own identity by presenting it
to others in objectified form."). See also M. MAuss, supra note 229, at 10 (In the system of
gift exchange, "[O]ne gives away what is in reality a part of one's nature and substance, while
to receive something is to receive a part of someone's spiritual essence.").
259. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
260. See Havighurst, supra note 164, at 14 ("[T]he great bulk of the more important
promises are made for the purpose of securing something in exchange, and the great bulk of
all promises are performed."). See also Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. Rav. 55 (1963); Law, Private Governance and Continuing
Relationships, 1985 Wis. L. RPv. 461 (Legal rules may be marginal to the keeping of business
promises.).
261. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
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question whether these needs "really" exist or, if they do, whether they
exist-at least in part-because of the system of legal rules that has been
adopted. The legal rules now in effect treat "gifts" as distinct from
"bargains." The qualities shared by these two "kinds" of transactions-
including the possibility that they both involve exchange-are submerged,
hidden in the very structure of distinction. We are thereby encouraged to
think of donative and commercial transfers as being "truly" distinct, and
to act accordingly. It is possible to ask whether the divergent mores and
norms we bring to gifts and to bargains are not in some degree a product
of that consciousness.
CONCLUSION
There is a stereotypical quality to much of the thinking that has been
done about gifts and bargains. The functionalists portray individuals as
both grossly impulsive and selfish; the consideration theorists portray the
market as an almost divinely apt ordering process; the social scientists
portray economic transactions as hostile exchanges of exact equivalents.
These pictures no doubt contain a germ of truth; how else can their
persistence and influence be explained? Yet as with any caricature, that
truth is only partial. Sometimes individuals are generous, the market fails,
and business people forego immediate advantage.
Skepticism seems an appropriate response to any attempt to define or
even describe how people or societies "are." Still, it is worthwhile to try
to expose the exaggerations in the caricatures of gifts and bargains because
they suppress the respects in which these transactions can be or feel alike.
That suppression can have two consequences. It may cause an individual
whose responses to giving or trading do not fit the stereotyped picture to
feel he or she is acting wrongly or inappropriately. It may also make existing
legal procedures and requirements seem necessary and thus mask the pos-
sibility that transactions can be structured and regulated in entirely different
ways.
There is nothing immutable about our patterns of giving. Changes in
social context-such as the fact that the elderly increasingly spend their last
years in institutions or retirement communities rather than with their fam-
ilies-have led to changes in patterns of testamentary disposition. 262 Changes
in the nature of wealth-from land or other goods to financial assets and
skills-have increased the importance of lifetime transfers and decreased
the importance of wealth transfer on death.263
Like these social and institutional phenomena, law is among the forces
in response to which individuals structure their lives. The legal requirements
262. J. RosiENFELD, supra note 108, at 62.
263. Langbein, supra note 256, at 722-23.
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applicable to giving may affect how much and to whom we give. More
importantly, they may affect how we understand our own generosity-
whether we see it as "natural" or "proper," as "like" or "unlike" other
activities in which we frequently engage.
The formalities now required for giving and the distinction between gifts
and bargains are part of this process. They may cause us to view generosity
as suspicious and trading as necessary or to assume that our motives must
be different in each context. They may thereby help create the reality to
which they pretend to respond.
It is not at all clear that we would "be" different were the legal
requirements for giving to change. Yet it is also not at all clear that we
"are" the careless, deceitful creatures the formalities seek to restrain, or
that gifts and bargains "are" different in any way that matters. There is
thus no reason to assume that the legal rules that now regulate donative
transfers are the only ones possible or desirable.
If there is any truth to the view that gifts create social bonds as important
in their way as the economic bonds of market exchanges, we might still
choose to retain a regime of formalities for donative transfers, but on quite
different grounds than those conventionally offered. We might, for example,
value the evidence formality supplies not because it combats likely perjury,
but because it demonstrates tangibly a social commitment that might oth-
erwise be invisible. Similarly, we might value the ritual of formality not
because it corrects impulsiveness, but for its own sake, as an expression of
"the fundamental human need for.., ceremony. 1264
Nonetheless, there is a case to be made for abandoning the formal rules
that presently govern donative transfers. They do not come to us new; they
come freighted with a baggage of justification that may prevent us from
according to gifts the social and emotional significance non-lawyers have
seen in them. They are associated, ideologically, with questionable distinc-
tions between giving and bargaining and equally questionable assumptions
about how individuals do or ought to behave in either variety of exchange.
Whether we can retain the rules without also retaining the distinctions and
assumptions that have grown up around them is an open question; until it
is resolved, there is something to be said for abandoning them all.
One thing is certain. The goals of the law of donative transfers are far
less clear than they are often made to appear. The law is outwardly
committed to the effectuation of individual intent with respect to gifts as
well as contracts. Yet it appears to value market exchanges, which are
perceived to create wealth, over gifts, which are perceived merely to redis-
tribute wealth. The law's relatively low regard for gifts makes it difficult
to carry out its commitment to them. Given this confusion, it is not
264. Cohen, supra note 144, at 582.
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surprising that, despite its ostensible commitment to gifts, the law adopts
intent-defeating requirements for donative transfers.

